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1957 Supreme(All) 182

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
M. L. Chaturvedi and Roy, JJ.
S.BARROW - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF U.P. - Respondents
Civil Misc. Appln. 119 Of 1955
Decided On : 07/30/1957

Advocates Appeared:
B.N.ROY, HALIMUDDIN, K.L.MISHRA, NAZIRUDDIN

Headnote:

LAND ACQUISITION - REHABILITATION OF REFUGEES ACT, 1948 - SECTION 11 - COMPENSATION - DETERMINATION - JURISDICTION OF LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER - REVIEW OF ORDER - INHERENT POWER - CONSTITUTION (FOURTH AMENDMENT) ACT, 1955 - EFFECT ON VALIDITY OF ACT AND PROVISIONS - ARTICLE 31-B - RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION - APPLICATION TO ACQUISITION OF LAND.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner's land was requisitioned and acquired by the Collector under the U.P. Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act, 1948. The Land Acquisition Officer determined compensation in accordance with the Act, ignoring two provisos that limited the compensation payable. The petitioner filed an application for reference of the matter to the Court under Section 11(3) of the Act. The State Government applied for review of the order, arguing that the provisos had been validated by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, which included the Act in the 9th Schedule. The Land Acquisition Officer allowed the review application and directed a fresh assessment of compensation based on the value of the land as on 1 September 1939. The petitioner challenged the review order by way of a writ petition.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the Land Acquisition Officer had no jurisdiction to review his previous order as the Act did not confer any such power and there was no inherent power to review orders passed after hearing the parties. The Court further held that the first order, which ignored the provisions of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, was erroneous and in contravention of the Constitution. However, the Court also held that the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act had retrospective operation and validated all the provisions of the U.P. Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act, including the two provisos that limited the compensation payable.

Issues: 1. Whether the Land Acquisition Officer had jurisdiction to review his previous order determining compensation? 2. Whether the first order, which ignored the provisions of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, was erroneous and in contravention of the Constitution? 3. Whether the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act had retrospective operation and validated all the provisions of the U.P. Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Act did not confer any power of review on the Land Acquisition Officer, and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure also did not apply to the proceedings before the said officer. There was no inherent power of review as the mistake committed by the Land Acquisition Officer in his order was not a clerical mistake or error arising from any accidental slip or omission, and the omission to apply the provisions of an enactment or of the Constitution, while deciding the matter within the jurisdiction of the court or officer, cannot be said to result in complete absence of jurisdiction to decide it. 2. The first order was erroneous and in contravention of the Constitution, as it stood amended after the coming into force of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, which validated all the provisions of the U.P. Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act. 3. Article 31-B of the Constitution clearly says that the provisions of the Acts included in the 9th Schedule shall not be deemed to be void or ever to have become void. This gives Article 31-B retrospective operation, and the U.P. Act must be deemed to be valid at least from the date that the Constitution came into force.

Final Decision: The Court allowed the writ petitions and quashed both the orders passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 19 May 1955 and 18 October 1955. The Land Acquisition Officer was directed to determine the compensation awardable to the petitioner in the two cases, according to law.

M. L. CHATURVEDI, J.

( 1 ) THE above two are applications under Article 226 of the Constitution. They raise common questions of law and may conveniently be disposed of together.

( 2 ) THE petitioner in both the cases is the same. He owned certain lands in villages Bhilawan and barha in the District ot Luck-now. The Collector of the District decided to requisition ami then to acquire portions of his land in the two villages. The Collector of Lucknow accordingly issued notices under Section 3 of the U. P. Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act, 1948, U. P. Act No. 26 of 1948. This Act will hereafter be referred to as the Act. Section 3 of the Act provides that if, in the opinion of the State Government or such other authority as the State Government may appoint in that behalf, it is necessary or expendient to requisition the land for purposes of erection of houses, shops or workshops for the renabitration of the refugees, the State Government or the appointed authority, as the case may be, muy by order requisition any land by serving on the owner and occupier thereof a notice stating that the State Government or the appointing authority has decided to requisition it in pursuance of this section. The notices were duly issued and served on the petitioner, and it is not denied that the notices were issued by proper authority. Subsequently on the 5th March, 1953, notices were issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act stating that the Collector had decided to acquire the land in pursuance of the sub-section. The petitioner is not disputing the correctness of the requisition or the acquisition and the only point in dispute is the amount of compensation to which he was entitled under Section 11 of the Act. This section provides that where any land is acquired under Section 9, there shall be paid compensation to the owner, the amount of which snail be determined by the Compensation officer in accordance with the principles set out in clauses first, second and third of Sub-section (1) and of Sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. There are then two provisos added to the sub-section and the first of them is important and may be quoted in full. It says,

"provided that the market value referred to in clause first of the said sub-section shall be deemed to be the market value of such land on the date of publication of the notice under Section 7 or 9, as the case may be, or on the first day of September, 1939, whichever is less:"

The second proviso refers to the case where the land was purchased by the owner after the first day of September, 1939 and before the first day of April, 1948, but that is not the case before us and the second proviso, therefore, need not be mentioned. As regards the above two provisos a division Bench of this Court, of which one of us was a member, held in the case of H. P. Khandewal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 All LJ 675 : ( (S) AIR 1955 All 12) (A), that the provisos contravened the provisions of Section 299 of the Government of India Act, as they did not provide for payment of proper compensation and had not been saved by the provisions of article 31 (5) of the Constitution.


( 3 ) CONSEQUENTLY, when the proceedings lor the determination of compensation were taken, the land Acquisition Oarcer (who was seized of the matter), calculated compensation according to the market value on the date of the acquisition under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act and ignored the two provisos of the Rehapilitation of Refugees Act. On the 19th May, 1955, be gave an award fixing a sum of Rs. 68,749-9-0 as compensation for the land acquired in village bnillawan and Rs. 56,516-14-0 as compensation lor the land acquired in village Barha. Tne petitioner, it appears, was not satisfied with the awards and on the 27th June 1955, ho filed two applications under Section 11 (3) of the Act for reference of the matter to Court, that is the district Judge. On the 13th September 1955, the Stat























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