( 1 ) TESE four criminal revisions raise common question of law. They have been heard together and may be disposed of by one judgment.

( 2 ) ON the 29th of March, 1955, between 7 and 8 p. m. certain licensed porters of the Char-Bagh railway station, Lucknow, presumably with a view to have certain grievances redressed, adopted what was contended on behalf of the prosecution civil disobedience or passive resistance (Satyagraha ). They were arrested for offences alleged to have been committed by them under sections 120 and 121, Railways Act and were put into prison. Two sets of these persons were tried within the jail precincts on the 30th of March, 1955, and the other two-sets were tried on the 31st of March, 1955. The trial was held under the summary provisions of the Code. These persons were found guilty and convicted under the two sections. They were fined Rs. 50/- each under Section 120/- and Rs. 100/- each under Section 121, in default of payment of which they were directed to undergo certain term of simple imprisonment.

( 3 ) THE first point which has been urged on behalf of the applicants is that the right which was given to them under Article 22 (1) of the Constitution and Section 340 of the Code of Criminal procedure had been denied by the Magistrate, inasmuch as the matter was pushed forward by the prosecution in such hot-haste that the applicants could not consult any legal practitioner, nor were they permitted to be defended by any legal practitioners. Article 22 (1) of the Constitution lays down that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed as soon as may be of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. Section 340 of the Code provides that any person accused of an offence before a criminal court, or against whom proceedings are instituted under the Code in any such court, may, of right, be defended by a pleader. The submission made on behalf of the applicants is that since the trial was held in jail very soon after the arrest of the applicants, the applicants had not had the opportunity to consult a legal practitioner of their choice or be defended by any legal practitioner. A similar question came up for consideration before this Court in -- kailash Nath v. Emperor, 1947 All 436 (AIR V 34) (A), where it was observed that where the accused were persons who were charged , of an offence they were entitled as a matter of right to be defended by a pleader and the learned Magistrate was bound to give to the accused sufficient opportunity to be represented by a lawyer, especially when they were in custody from the time they had been arrested and accused of the offence. In enunciating those principles reliance was placed upon what was observed in a Bombay case in - in re Llewelyn Evana, 1926 Bom 551 (AIR V 13) (B), where Fawcett J. , held that Section 340, criminal Procedure Code.

"not only contemplates that the accused should foe at liberty to be defended by a pleader at the time the proceedings are actually going on, but also implies that he should have a reasonable opportunity, if in custody, of getting info communication with his legal adviser for the purpose of preparing his defence. "

( 4 ) IN 1947 All 436 (AIR V 34) (A), the question was also raised as to whether a Magistrate can hold his Court in the usual court room or whether he can hold it even in the jail precincts, and it was laid down that there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which would compel a Magistrate to hold his Court in the usual court room, that Section 352 probably contemplates that a Magistrate can hold his court anywhere he likes, but the Magistrate, where-ever he may be compelled to sit by executive orders, is bound by the provisions of Section 352 and he must realise that the place where the trial is held must be something like an open court to which the public generally may have access so far as