( 1 ) I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my learned brother and I concur in the order proposed by him. In view of the Full discussion of the facts and the law contained in that judgment it is hardly necessary for me to add anything. I would, however, like to emphasise that though the Court may inquire into the fact of the Governors satisfaction, it cannot inquire into the reasons for that satisfaction or into the sufficiency of those reasons.

( 2 ) IN the present case there is no evidence to show that the Governor was not in fact satisfied. The material contained in the counter affidavit (the correctness of which is not disputed)indicates that the Governor was satisfied after mature and prolonged deliberation of the necessity for an amendment of the Sales Tax Act in order to meet the revenue requirements of the State. At first the necessity was not immediate since correspondence was going on between the State government and the Union Government with regard to the matter and there was no reason to suppose that that correspondence would lead to no result. As the 1st of April came nearer and nearer the Governor became satisfied of the need for immediate action. There is no reason to suppose that this was anything but bona fide satisfaction.

( 3 ) THE 1st of April was an essential date because the financial year as well as the year under the sales Tax Act begins on that date. Although an amending Act, when it came, might have given the tax retrospective effect, it is easy to visualise the difficulties to which such a course would have given rise--difficulties relating to the maintenance of accounts by the persons to be taxed, and difficulties relating to persons called upon to pay the tax recouping themselves from persons who should have paid them. Moreover it cannot be said that the Governor acted unreasonably in preferring to issue an Ordinance rather than to wait for an enactment which would give retrospective effect to taxation provisions.

( 4 ) IT is true that when the satisfaction originated in the mind of the Governor both the Houses of the Legislature were in Session. That, however, does not mean that the measure could be proceeded with by Legislative enactment. If any legislation were to be undertaken the Bill passed would, in view of the provisions of the Essential Goods (Declaration and Regulation of tax on Sale and Purchase) Act, 1952, have to be reserved for the consideration of the President -. It was already known that, although the quesion had been before the Union Government for several months, no conclusion had been arrived at (sic) was not unreasonable to suppose that in these circumstances the assent of the President was not (sic) to be obtained before the 1st of april even (sic) a Bill was hurried through the Legislature. The (sic) alternative, therefore, was the utilisation of the Governors power to issue an Ordinance.

( 5 ) MR. Banerji appealed to us in the name "democratic principle" to confine within very (sic)limits the Ordinance making power of the Governor. It is true that the basis of our Constitution is democratic but the framers of the Constitution, with all their democratic bias, felt it necessary to vest reserve powers in various functionaries, including the Governor, to be utilized when it was considered by these functionaries to be necessary. As my learned brother has pointed out it is for the Courts to give effect to such provisions and not to do away with, or whittle down, the powers so conferred by a process of construction. Of course, if the functionary concerned acts in excess of the powers conferred upon him, the High courts will refuse to uphold his action but that is the limit of the function assigned by the constitution to High Courts.

( 6 ) MUCH of the affidavit and the counter-affidavit and the arguments of the petitioners learned counsel were concerned with the merits, or demerits, of the taxation made possible by the ordinance. It is, therefore, n