An order of dismissal replaces the order of suspension which then ceases to exist.

( 1 ) THIS is a defendants first appeal arising out of a suit for a declaration that the plaintiff continued to be in the service of the defendant and for arrears of salary. The claim for declaration of the plaintiffs continuance in service was, however, given up subsequently taut the claim for arrears was followed up.

( 2 ) THE facts of the case briefly are that the plaintiff was a sub-inspector of police in the employ of the defendant-appellant; he was suspended pending enquiry into certain charges by an order dated 13-4-1942, and was, ultimately dismissed by an order dated 30-10-1943. The plaintiff then filed a departmental appeal and as a result of that appeal the order of dismissal was set aside on 18-10-1946.

( 3 ) THE suit which has given rise to the present appeal was, however, instituted on 8-10-1946, for a declaration that the order of dismissal, which had not till then been set aside in appeal, was invalid and void and for recovery of arrears of salary. The suit for declaration became in-fructuous as the order of dismissal was set aside during the pendency of the suit. The plaintiff claimed salary at the rates given in the plaint along with station allowance and dearness allowance.

( 4 ) THE suit was contested by the defendant on various grounds. It was contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to his full salary inasmuch as he was under suspension from 13-4-1942, till 30-10-1943, when he was dismissed and that this order of suspension was revived when the order of dismissal was set aside in appeal on 13-10-1946. In effect it was pleaded that the plaintiff had all along been under suspension and was entitled only to subsistence allowance which he had already received.

( 5 ) THE lower Court found that the plaintiff was entitled to his salary from 13-4-1942, up to 17-10-1946, when his dismissal was set aside, as the plaintiff could not be deprived of his salary during the period of suspension after he had been reinstated. The claim was ultimately decreed for the recovery of Rs. 6,028/5/- with proportionate costs. The defendant has now come up in appeal.

( 6 ) THE short point involved in this appeal is if the plaintiff should be deemed to be under suspension after the order of dismissal was pass-ed on 30-10-1943, till he was ordered to be reinstated on 18-10-4946. The leiarned counsel for the respondent has conceded that the plaintiff does not now claim any salary for the period when he was under suspension up to the 30-10-1943. In view of this statement made by the learned counsel for the respondent it is not necessary to decide whether the plaintiff was or was not entitled to his full salary for the period during which he was under suspension pending an enquiry and before his dismissal.

( 7 ) THE order of dismissal of the plaintiff was passed on 30-10-1943, and it is contended on behalf of the respondent that the order of dismissal passed on 30-10-1943, terminated the order of suspension which had been passed earlier on 13-4-1942, and could not be revived by any subsequent order passed at the time of the re-in-statement on 18-10-1946. The learned counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, has argued that the dismissal having been set aside in a departmental appeal on 18-10-1946, the status quo was restored and the order of suspension which operated before the order of dismissal was passed became operative when the order of dismissal was set aside. Two points now arise for consideration out of these arguments. Firstly, it has to be seen whether the order of reinstatement passed on 18-10- 1946, contained any direction for the revival of the order of suspension which came to an end when the order of dismissal was passed on 30-10-1943. Secondly, even if such an order reviving the suspension was made, whether it was open to the defendant to pass an order reviving a sus-pension retrospectively. The order dated 18-10-1946, has been filed. It was signed by the Inspector General of Police and bears th