IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Agarwala and Chaturvedi, JJ.
PHEKU CHAMAR - Appellant
Versus
HARISH CHANDRA - Respondents
Second Appeal 103 Of 1949
Decided On : 01/09/1953
LICENCE - JOINT HINDU FAMILY - TRANSFER OF PROPERTY - U. P. ZAMINDARI ABOLITION AND LAND REFORMS ACT, 1951 - SECTION 9 - INTERPRETATION - SIR LAND - ABADI LAND - U. P. VILLAGE ABADI ACT - SECTION 2 - DEFINITION OF ABADI - COMPENSATION FOR IMPROVEMENTS - TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 - SECTION 51 - EASEMENTS ACT, 1882 - SECTION 64 - APPLICABILITY.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiffs, members of a joint Hindu family, sued for possession of a piece of land in village Mirpur, district Jaunpur, alleging that the pro forma defendants, also members of the family, had granted a licence to the other defendants to make constructions on the land without consideration and legal necessity.
Finding of the Court:
The trial court and the lower appellate court found that the property in suit was the ancestral property of the joint family consisting of the plaintiffs and the pro forma defendants and that it bore the character of sir land. The courts also held that the licence was without consideration and there was no legal necessity for it.
Issues: 1. Whether the suit was barred by limitation. 2. Whether the suit was barred by the principles of estoppel and acquiescence. 3. Whether the suit was barred under Section 11, C. P. C. 4. Whether the defendants were entitled to the land under the provisions of Section 9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951. 5. Whether the licence granted by the pro forma defendants was valid. 6. Whether the land had ceased to be sir and had become abadi land under the provisions of the U. P. Village Abadi Act.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The suit was not barred by limitation as it was brought within 12 years of the date of the alleged licence. 2. The suit was not barred by the principles of estoppel and acquiescence as the defendants had not proved that the plaintiffs had acquiesced in the licence or that they had been estopped from challenging it. 3. The suit was not barred under Section 11, C. P. C. as the defendants had not proved that they were in possession of the land as tenants of the plaintiffs. 4. The defendants were not entitled to the land under the provisions of Section 9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 as the section applied only to persons who lawfully held the land. 5. The licence granted by the pro forma defendants was not valid as it was without consideration and there was no legal necessity for it. 6. The land had not ceased to be sir and had not become abadi land under the provisions of the U. P. Village Abadi Act as the constructions made by the defendants were not improvements to the land and the defendants did not believe in good faith that they were absolutely entitled to the property.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed and the plaintiffs were granted possession of the land. The defendants were granted three months time to remove the constructions and on their failure to do so, the constructions would be removed by the executing Court and the costs incurred therein would be recoverable from the defendants.
( 1 ) THIS is a defendants appeal arising out of a suit for possession of a piece of land situate in village Mirpur, district Jaunpur.
( 2 ) THE plaintiffs and defendants 53 to 67 form a joint Hindu family and the plaintiffs are the descendants of the defendants mentioned above. These defendants 53 to 67 gave a licence in the year 1937 to defendants 1 to 52 permitting them to make constructions on the land in suit, and defendants 1 to 52 accordingly have made certain constructions. The main defendants are these defendants 1 to 52 and they will be hereinafter referred to as the defendants. The other defendants, namely, defendants 53 to 67, the grantors of the licence, will be referred to as pro forma defendants.
( 3 ) THE plaintiffs case was that they constitute a joint Hindu family with the pro forma defendants and the property in suit is the joint ancestral property of the plaintiffs. It was alleged that the pro forma defendants had no right to grant a licence of the land in suit to the other defendants and that the said licence was void and ineffective inasmuch ag the licence was not given for consideration and was not justified by legal necessity. The prayer of the plaintiffs, therefore, was that they should be put into possession of the property in suit and the constructions made by the defendants on the land be ordered to be removed.
( 4 ) THE main defences to the suit were that the plaintiffs had nothing to do with the land in suit, that the pro forma defendants were the zamindars of the laud and that they had every right to grant the licence. It was also pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation and by the principles of estoppel and acquiescence. A plea under Section 11, C. P. C. , was also raised.
( 5 ) THE learned Munsif found that the property in suit was the ancestral property of the joint family consisting of the plaintiffs and the pro forma defendants and that it bore the character of sir land. He further held that the licence was without consideration and there was no legal necessity for it. The learned Munsif then considered the issues on bar by 8. 11, Civil P. C. , and on estoppel and on acquiescence and decided those issues against the defendants. The suit was obviously not barred by time inasmuch as it was brought within 12 years of the date of the alleged licence. In the result, he decreed the suit for possession as prayed and allowed the defendants three months time to remove their building material. In default, the building material was to be removed through the agency of the Court and the defendants were liable for payment of ex-penses incurred therein.
( 6 ) THE defendants then went up in appeal from this decree and the learned Civil Judge upheld the findings of the learned Munsif on all the points mentioned above and dismissed the appeal. The defendants then filed a second appeal in this Court which came up for hearing before a learned single Judge on 14-11-1952. The learned single Judge was of the opinion that the findings arrived at by the Courts below were findings of fact which could not be challenged in second appeal, but because a new point was raised before him by the learned counsel for the appellants, he referred the case to a Division Bench. The new point that was raised before the learned single judge was to the effect that the suit should fail because of the provisions of Section 9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, Act No. 1 of 1951. On this point the learned single judge remarked that he stood committed to the view that the word "held" used in the section meant "lawfully held". But he referred the case because his previous decision was a single Judge decision. "we may note here that in referring the case, the learned single Judge has made it clear that he is referring the whole case and not any particular point arising in the case. We are, therefore, seized of the whole case.
( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the appellants has argued the point raised be
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