The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of Section 326 of the Municipalities Act in determining the limitation period for the plaintiff's suit.

( 1 ) THIS is a plaintiffs application in revision against a decree of a Small Cause Court Judge, dismissing his suit for recovery of arrears of pay and certain other amounts. The applicant was in the employ of the Municipal Board, Kanpur at a monthly salary of Es. 50, in charge of looking after the Boards cases in various Courts. He was suspended from service on 2-9-1941 and, later on, prosecuted in two cases for misappropriation of funds. In one he was acquitted on the 4th january, and in the other discharged on 1-2-1943. He was then re-instated on 7-3-1943; but departmental proceedings being taken against him, he was dismissed from service on 22-18 1948. When re-instated, he was not paid the remaining 3/4ths of his salary for the period of his suspension, 3-9-1941 to 7-3 1943, only 1/4th being paid to him during the interval as a subsistence allowance He served a notice on the Board on 21-10 1944, asking for the arrears of his pay at the rate of Es. 37-8-0 per month, some dearness allowance and the Boards contribution to his Provident Fund Account of the said period. This being refused, he filed the suit on 22-12 1944.

( 2 ) AMONG other defenses, the Board resisted the claim by a plea of limitation which was accepted by the Court below, and, in the result, the suit was dismissed. This is the only point to be decided in this revision.

( 3 ) THE answer to the question whether or not the suit was time-barred depends on whether it was governed by Section 326, D. P. Municipalities Act (II [2] of 1916), providing a six months rule of limitation, or by the relevant provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, providing a three years period. The former section, omitting unnecessary words, lays down :

"no suit against a Board in respect of an act done or purporting to have been done in its official capacity shall be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action. "

( 4 ) ONE of the questions before the Court below was whether the cause of action had arisen on 7. 3. 1943, when the applicant was re-instated or on the date when his demand for payment of the arrears of salary was refused. There is no difficulty in answering this question, as it must be taken that the cause of action had really arisen on the earlier date. The real question is whether the suit should have been brought within six months of the accrual of the cause of action, as required by Section 326, Municipalities Act, or whether it could be filed within the larger period allowed by the Limitation Act. On this, I find a considerable divergence of opinion in this Court, and it is necessary that the matter be finally determined by a larger Bench.

( 5 ) BEFORE I set oat the various rulings to indicate the conflict, I may just mention that there is a material difference between the language of Section 73, Municipalities Act XV [15] of 1873 and that of Section 326 of the present Municipalities Act; while the former provided for a suit in respect of any act done or purporting to have been done "in pursuance of the Act," the latter refers, as I have already said, to a suit against a Municipal Board in respect of an act done or purporting to have been done "in its official capacity. Section 273, Cantonments Act II [2] of 1924 and Section 192, U. P. District Boards Act X [10] of 1922 also have the words, shown by me within inverted comas, of Section 73, Municipalities Act XV [15] of 1873 but not Section 326 of the present Municipalities Act. In various cases decided by the Courts in this country, a question arose whether a claim based on a contract entered into by a Board could be said be one in respect of an act done by it in pursuance of a particular Act, the Municipalities Act, the cantonments Act, or the District Boards Act, and the consensus of opinion seems to be that it could not be so regarded. The words "in pursuance of the Act" having now been replaced by the words "done in its official capacity," the question aris