( 1 ) ON 26-9-1946, Natha, respondent, claiming to be the hereditary tenant of a plot of land in village Udra Pachhlai, instituted a suit in the Court of the Munsif (Central) Hardoi for recovery of possession of the plot against Bhikham, appellant, who was said to be a trespasser. Bhikham claimed to be a sub-tenant and an issue was framed to determine this claim and was remitted to the Revenue Court for a finding.

( 2 ) WHILE the matter was still before the revenue Court, Section 180, U. P. Tenancy Act, was amended in such a way that suits even by tenants against treapassera became triable by revenue courts and consequently the jurisdiction of the civil Court became barred under Section 242, tenancy Act.

( 3 ) THE Revenue Court, therefore, returned the cage to the civil Court and the defendant applied to the civil Court pointing out the amendment of the law and praying that no further proceedings be taken by the civil Court, The civil Court overruled this plea and held that it had jurisdiction to dispose of the suit which had, at the time of its institution, been rightly instituted in the civil court according to the Full Bench decision in Ori Lal v. Ganeshi (1947 Oudh W. N. 42 ).

( 4 ) THEREAFTER the issue was again remitted to the Revenue Court for a finding and the Revenue court in the absence of the defendant, found that it was not established that the defendant was a sub-tenant. The finding was returned to the Munsif who proceeded to decree the suit with costs.

( 5 ) THE defendant appealed to the District Judge, Hardoi and raised the plea of want of jurisdiction in the civil Court at the date that the decree was passed. The learned District Judge upheld the decision of the Munsif that the civil Court continued to have jurisdiction to dispose of the suit inspite of the amendment of Section 180, U. P. Tenancy Act. He accordingly dismissed the appeal The defendant has now come up in second appeal. The only question involved is what is the effect of the amendment in the law daring the pendency of the suit.

( 6 ) THE amendment which has taken place is in the law of procedure. The well understood principle is that an alteration in the law of procedure has immediate effect--vide Craies on the interpretation of Statutes, p. 332. The reason for this is that "no one has any vested interest in the course of procedure" and consequently vested rights are rot affected by any change in procedure, this matter is fully discussed in Naqi Ahmad v. Shiv Shankar Lal, A. I. R. (20) 1933 Oudh 274 in which case the English and Indian decisions on the subject are fully discussed. This is a Single judge decision but it was re-affirmed by a Division Bench in Amir Haider v. Babbu Lal, A. I. R. (21) 1934 Oudh 16.

( 7 ) BOTH the Oudh cases mentioned above related to a change in the procedure relating to the sale of land in execution of decrees. In accordance with the provisions of Civil Procedure Code read with a notification issued by Government under Section 68, Civil P. C. on 7-10-1911, the civil court which passed the decree had authority to sell all immovable property except ancestral estates. In the exercise of this authority, the civil Court had directed the sale of agricultural land which it had held to be self-acquired and ordered the sale to proceed under its own control. While the proceedings were still pending, no sale having taken place, but after the execution application had been made, the Government issued a fresh notification under Section 68, Civil P. C and cancelled the earlier notification. By this notification it was directed that "with effect from 1-4-1932, the execution of decree in cases in which a civil Court has ordered any agricultural land situated in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh or any interest in such land to be sold, shall be transferred to the Collector.

( 8 ) UPON the issue of this notification the judgment-debtor prayed for the transfer of execution to the Collector, but the civil Court dismissed t