( 1 ) THIS is a defendants appeal arising out of a suit for partition of a grove and for recovery of Rs. 200/- on account of the price of certain trees which were cut away by the defendants.

( 2 ) THE parties belong to one family. The plaintiffs are the sons of one Bahadur. The defendants to the suit were the descendants of one Nathua, Bahadurs brother. The appellant, one of the defendants, is a minor, grandson of Nathua. Defendants Nos. 2 to 5 were the other descendants of Nathua. Defendant No. 6 was the transferee of the trees. The plaintiffs alleged that they were owners of one-half of the grove as it was the ancestral property of the parties. The defendants, on the other hand, alleged that the plaintiffs had no right in the grove in suit, and that the grove was planted about 40 years ago with the permission of the zamindar by the sons of Nathua in the plot which had come to their share. There were other pleas with which we are not concerned.

( 3 ) THE trial Court held that the plaintiffs had no share in the grove and as such, dismissed the suit. There was an appeal by the plaintiffs. During the hearing of the appeal there was a compromise. It appears that the defendant appellants Sagwa minor was represented in the suit through his mother Shrimati Chunia as his guardian. She had signed a vakalatnama in favour of sri Raghubar Dayal, advocate and it was filed in the trial Court. No vakalatnama was filed on her behalf in the Court of appeal. Sri Raghubar Dayal however, acting on the vakalatnama that had been filed in his favour in the trial Court signed the compromise which apparently had been entered into between the plaintiffs and the major defendants in the suit. No application was made to the Court for leave on behalf of the minor to compromise the suit, as required by Order 32 rule 1, C. P. C. Ultimately the Court passed a decree in terms of the compromise. The compromise was to the effect that the plaintiffs would have a half share in the grove and that its land shall be partitioned as agreed upon between, the parties. Apparently the plaintiffs gave up their claim with regard to the price of the trees. Against this decree, Sagwa minor has come up in appeal to this Court and the ground urged on his behalf is that the decree passed by the Court below was vitiated inasmuch as no leave of the Court was obtained under the provisions of Order 32, Rule 1 and the compromise was not binding on him.

( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents has taken a preliminary objection to the hearing of this appeal. He has contended that no appeal lies against a consent decree as provided under section 98, C. P. C. The question, therefore, that falls to be determined is whether an appeal lies to this Court in the circumstances of this case. Section 96, C. P. C. no doubt provides that no appeal shall lie against a consent decree. We have no doubt that a consent decree spoken of in section 96 must be a valid consent decree. Could the decree passed by the Court below be said to be valid consent decree?

( 5 ) NOW Order 32, Rule 7 provides, "7 (1)--No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian. (2) Any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Court so recorded shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor. " the provisions of this rule are mandatory. Since no leave of the Court was obtained or expressly recorded in the proceedings, the compromise entered into on behalf of the minor could be avoided by the minor. If the compromise was not binding on the minor and could be avoided by him, the decree passed on its basis could not be said to be a decree passed with his consent. It is true that the advocate, appearing on behalf of the minor, had a vakalatnama in his favour in the trial Court w