C. B. AGARWALA, J.

( 1 ) THIS is one out of numerous writ applications filed in this Court questioning the validity of the u. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, No. 1 of 1951, hereinafter referred to as "the act" or "the impugned Act". The validity of the Act has been upheld in a recent decision of a full Bench of this Court, vide suryapal Singh v. Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh, 1951 a. L. J. 365.

( 2 ) SRI Prem Mohan Verma, learned counsel for the applicant, however, urges that there are several points that arise in the case which were not argued before the Pull Bench and hence were not dealt with by that Bench, He contends that the Act is invalid for several reasons.

( 3 ) THE first ground argued is that apart from the provisions of Article 31 (2), the State Legislature was incompetent to legislate with regard to the acquisition of the property of the intermediaries on condition of payment of compensation by means of bonds. It is urged that the condition of payment of compensation by bonds is no payment of compensation at all, inasmuch as a bond is merely a promise to pay in future and is not equivalent to payment in cash. It is further urged that the State Legislature under the powers given to it, under entry 36 of list II of the 7th schedule, can only legislate with regard to acquisition of property, if there had been an enactment laying down principles of cash payment under entry 42 of list III; and as the principles of payment of compensation laid down in the impugned Act are not principles of payment of cash compensation, they are no principles at all and consequently the State Legislature could not pass the Act.

( 4 ) NO doubt, Section 68 of the Zamindari Abolition Act makes it possible for the State government to prescribe that compensation shall be payable entirely in bonds and it may be assumed that a bond is a promise to pay in future and that it does not amount to payment in cash

"in presenti. That, however, does not mean that there is no payment of compensation whatsoever. But assuming, for the sake of argument, that no payment of compensation is provided for in the Act, the question still remains whether the State Legislature had the power to pass the Act. The argument is based upon the words "subject to" that appear in entry 36 of list II and upon the word "compensation" appearing in entry 42 list III. This argument was considered by the Full Bench and it was held that "the words subject to the provisions of entry 42 of list III do not by themselves mean that the state Legislature cannot legislate with respect to the acquisition of property unless there is a public purpose and only on payment of compensation. "

It may be added that the various entries are not powers of legislation but fields of legislation. Where one entry is made subject to another entry, all that it means is that out of the scope of the former entry a field of legislation covered by the latter entry has been reserved to be specially dealt with by the appropriate legislature. The subject-matter of entry 36 of list II is acquisition or requisitioning of property except for the purposes of the Union. The subject-matter of entry 42 of list III is the principles on which compensation for the property acquired or requisitioned is to be determined and the form and manner in which such compensation is to be given. Out of the field of legislation on the subject-matter of acquisition or requisition of property except for the purpose of Union, the subject-matter concerned with the principles of compensation and form and manner in which it is to be given is taken out and reserved to be legislated upon by the union or the State. If there is no legislation under entry 42 of list III, there is nothing to prevent the State Legislature from making any enactment with respect to the subject of acquisition or requisitioning of property. The power to legislate is given in Article 246. Under that Article a state Legislature has power to legisla

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