V. BHARGAVA, J.

( 1 ) THESE are two connected appeals which have been filed by the same appellant against the same respondent. These two appeals arise out of two suits which were both for realisation of profits in respect of certain zamindari property. One suit related to the years 1345, 1346 and 1347 Fasli and the other to the years 1348, 1349 and 1350 Fasli. In both the suits, one important question that arose for decision was as to the share possessed by the plaintiff-appellant in the property in respect of which profits were claimed by him. Amongst other shares claimed was one-sixth share in some property which had gone to Sm. Saraswati Kuar, the sister of the plaintiffs grandmother, by virtue of a decree in a suit which Sm. Saraswati Kuar had filed against the plaintiff and others and which was decreed on the basis of an adjustment between the parties to that suit. The appellant had claimed that he was still entitled to that one-sixth share because the adjustment in that suit was not binding on him and, therefore, the lambardar was liable to pay profits to him in respect of that share in the property also. The lower appellate Court has held that the decree in the suit between Sm. Saraswati Kuar and the plaintiff and others was binding on the plaintiff until it was set aside by means of a separate suit and, therefore, the plaintiff Could not claim the one-sixth share in the property which had gone, by virtue of that decree, to Sm. Saraswati Kuar. This finding of the lower Court has been challenged in these second appeals.

( 2 ) ONE more point decided by the learned lower Court was that the profits in respect of the year 134s Fasli had been paid to Brij Bhukan Singh guardian ad litem of the appellant by the lambardar and, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to claim those profits again. This finding of the lower Court has also been assailed in Second Appeal No. 911 of 1947.

( 3 ) SO far as the first question contested by the parties in these appeals is concerned, it does appear to me that the view of the law taken by the lower Court is not quite correct. According to the lower Court, the decree passed in the suit filed by Sm. Saraswati Kuar against the plaintiff and others could not be avoided by the plaintiff unless the plaintiff had it set aside by means of a separate suit. It has been pointed out to me that on behalf of the plaintiff that decree was sought to be avoided on the ground that the plaintiff was a minor and he had not been properly represented in that suit by his guardian, Brij Bhukhan Singh. I agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that, in order to avoid the decree on the ground that the minor had not been properly represented in the suit in which that decree was passed, it is not necessary to file a separate suit. If it can be shown on behalf of the minor that he was not properly represented in that suit, the decree must be treated as null and void and can, therefore, be assailed in any proceedings whatsoever where this question may be relevant. In Rashidunnisa v. Muhammad ismail Khan, 31 ALL. 572, it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that if a married woman was appointed guardian ad litem of her minor sister contrary to the provisions of Section 457, Civil P. C. (XIV [14] of 1882), the minor had not been properly represented in the litigation and the decree passed in that suit was liable to be set aside. In Khiarajmal v. Daim, 32 Cal. 296, it was again held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that if a Court proceeded to sell the property of persons who were not parties to the proceedings or properly represented on the record, the decrees or sales as against such persons were void without any proceedings to set them aside. In this case, if it be held that the plaintiff was not properly represented in that suit by his guardian Brij Bhukhan Singh, then, according to the view taken in the two cases cited above, it would have to be held that the decree passed against the plai