( 1 ) THIS is a decree-holders appeal arising out of an execution proceeding in which the main point for consideration is whether Article 182 or 183, Limitation Act, 1908, applies to the execution application, dated 22-9-1946. The relevant facts are as follows :

( 2 ) THE Banaras Bank, Limited, is under liquidation and on 15-9-1942, a payment order for Rs. 95,178-5-9 was passed against the respondent by this Court under Section 186, Companies Act, 1913. By virtue of Section 199, Companies Act, 1913, this order is enforceable as a decree. In 1946 an application for execution was made to this Court and on 12-9-1946, the Registrar transferred the execution to the District Judge of Allahabad. On 23-9-1916, an execution application was made by the Liquidator to the District Judge who transferred it to the Civil judge. It was in the last mentioned Court that the objection which has to be considered in this appeal was filed by the judgment-debtor. Inter alia it was contended that the execution application was time barred. The judgment-debtors case was that Article 182, which provides three years period of limitation applied; while according to the decree-holder Article 183, with twelve years limitation was applicable. Learned Civil Judge agreed with the judgment-debtors contention and dismissed the execution application as time barred.

( 3 ) ARTICLE 182 is applicable to applications

"for the execution of a decree or order of any civil Court not provided for by Article 183 or by section 48, Civil P. C. , 1908. " article 183, applies inter alia to applications for enforcing. "a judgment, decree or order of any Court established by Royal Charter in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. "

The decree-holders contention is that the order which was passed by this Court under Section 186, Companies Act, was an order of the nature contemplated by Article 183. The point for consideration thus is whether the said order was one which was passed by this Court "in the exercise of its Ordinary original civil jurisdiction. " The Limitation Act in which this phrase occurs does not define this phrase. So one way to look at the matter is to assign the plain literal meaning to the words "ordinary original civil jurisdiction". Another way to look at the matter is to interpret this phrase with reference to the Letters Patent of this Court, as it is in the Letters patent that the jurisdictions of the High Courts are provided.

( 4 ) WE consider the matter firstly from the first point of view. The word "ordinary" means that which happens in the usual course of business. Now so far as the company matters are concerned sub-section (1) of Section 3, Companies Act provides:

"the Court having jurisdiction under this Act shall be the High Court having jurisdiction in the place at which the registered office of the company is situate: provided that the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette and subject to such restrictions and conditions as it thinks fit, empower any District Court to exercise all or any of the jurisdiction by this Act conferred upon the Court, and in that case such District Court shall, as regards the jurisdiction so conferred, be the Court in respect of all companies having their registered offices in the district. "

It is clear from the above that normally it is the High Court which has the jurisdiction under the companies Act and it is only by a special order that the District Court may have jurisdiction and that too within the limits prescribed by the said order. It follows, therefore, that ordinarily it is the High Court which has the jurisdiction in company matters.

( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents conceded that the order passed by this Court on 15-9-1942, was in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. So the order of this Court was both "ordinary" and "original". The only question which remains is whether it was the exercise of a civil jurisdiction or any other kind