By the Court.—We have heard Shri P.K. Jain, learned counsel for the appellant.

2. The appellant has not made statutory deposit of Rs. 25000/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for maintaining this appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that since the Insurance Company has deposited the entire amount of compensation before the Tribunal, therefore the appellant is not required to deposit the statutory deposit of Rs. 25,000/- for maintaining this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and he filed an application for exempting the appellant from making statutory deposit of Rs. 25,000/-.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the requirement of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is satisfied as the Insurance Company has already deposited the entire amount to pay the compensation and no useful purpose will be served directing the appellant to deposit Rs. 25,000/- for filing the appeal. The purpose of the section is to ensure deposit of Rs. 25,000/- only with a view to pay the same amount to the aggrieved party. Here in the present case since the entire amount has already been deposited, therefore, the object of Section 173 has already been achieved and therefore there will no use to direct the appellant to deposit Rs. 25,000/- more for the same award under challenge. In his submissions, if the application is not allowed serious prejudice be caused to the appellant, therefore, his exemption application should be allowed.

4. Before examining the prayer of the appellant with regard to the exemption to deposit Rs. 25,000/- for filing the present appeal, the language used in sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is required to be looked into which is reproduced below :

"173. Appeals.—(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court :

Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court :

Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.

(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees."

5. On a plain reading of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 173, it is apparent that any person who is required to pay any amount under an award passed by the Claims Tribunal, his appeal can be entertained by the High Court only if he makes deposit of a specific amount as required by the said proviso and he cannot claim exemption from making the deposit on the ground that amount under award has already been deposited by another co-respondent.

6. The first and preliminary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question of interpretation arises only when the language is ambiguous and is capable other interpretation also.

7. From the bare perusal of the language of the proviso of sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it is apparent that the language is clear and unambiguous and no second meaning as contained in the section itself can be given.

8. The Apex Court in the case of Nelson Motis v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1981; Gurudevdatt VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2001 SC 1980; (2001) 4 SCC 534, State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, AIR 2005 SC 294 has held that if the words of statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, they are reasonably, susceptible to only one meaning are bound to gi