By the Court.—Heard learned counsel for the appellants.

2. This is an appeal against the following order of the learned Single Judge dated 17.9.2008 in a writ petition which is pending :

“Learned Standing Counsel has accepted notice on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

Issue notice to other respondents No. 3 to 7 returnable after six weeks. Steps to be taken within a week.

List after six weeks.”

3. The writ petition was filed by the appellants challenging the order dated 18.7.2008 passed by the Prescribed Authority in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter called the “Act, 1860”). There are two reasons due to which this special appeal cannot be entertained. Firstly, the order impugned in the writ petition was an order passed by the Prescribed Authority in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, 1860 and the Prescribed Authority while exercising jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, 1860 acts as a Tribunal hence the Special Appeal is barred under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of Rules of the Court.

4. A Division Bench of this Court in Mohd. Tabib Khan v. State of U.P. and others, 2007(10) ADJ 578 (DB), has laid down relying on earlier judgments of this Court that Special Appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court is not maintainable against an order passed by one Judge in a writ petition where the order of the Prescribed Authority is under challenge.

5. In the present case, the writ petition filed by the petitioners-appellants was against an order of the Prescribed Authority. The special appeal arising out of such a writ petition is clearly barred under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. The judgment of Mohd. Tabib Khan (supra) is fully applicable and the appeal is not maintainable.

6. Secondly, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is an order in which only notices were issued and the case has been directed to be listed after six weeks. By the said order the stay application has neither been allowed nor rejected.

7. The question which is to be considered in the present case is as to whether the order dated 17.9.2008, passed in the writ petition as extracted above is a “judgment” within the meaning of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. The special appeal as provided under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court is nothing but continuation of Letters Patent Appeal which was provided for in the charter of the High Court. The word “judgment” against which the Letters Patent Appeal was contemplated came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Shah Babu Lal Khimji v. Jayaben, AIR 1981 SC 1786. The Apex Court was considering in the said case the scope of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court which contemplated Letters Patent Appeal against judgment of a Single Judge. The Apex Court held in the above judgment that every interIocutory order passed by a learned Single Judge cannot be held to be a judgment, but only those orders would be judgment which decide matters affecting vital and valuable rights of the parties. The Apex Court also held that the orders contemplated under Order 43 Rule 1 which have been expressly made appealable under C.P.C. shall also be appealable under Letters Patent Appeal. The Supreme Court again considered the word “judgment” as used in the Letters Patent Appeal in Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. and others v. Chunilal Nanda and others, (2006) 5 SCC 399. In paragraph 15 of the said judgment, interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of the case were categorised in 5 categories and one of the category i.e. category (iv) was routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment. The Apex Court laid down in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the said judgment which is quoted below :

“15. lnterim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the