2009 Supreme(All) 2516
[2009(7) ADJ 168 (DB)]
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
BEFORE : S. RAFAT ALAM AND SUDHIR AGARWAL, JJ.
STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ....Appellants
Versus
COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT, ANJUMAN MADARSA NOORUL ISLAM, GHAZIPUR AND ANOTHER ......Respondents
(Civil Misc. Intervener Application No. 87478 of 2009 in Special Appeal No. 517 of 2009, decided on 6th July, 2009)
Counsel :
V.K.S. Chaudhary and B.N. Singh for the Intervener; Ch. N.A. Khan, S.C. for the Respondents.
Headnote:Code of Civil Procedure, 1908—Order I, Rule 8-A—Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952—Rule 5-A—Intervener—Power of Court to permit—Where a person is a proper party to be heard in the matter he should be allowed opportunity to be heard but simply because someone has come and requested to be heard; could not be permitted—In present case, the intervenor’s application is not supporting either of the parties but intended to make out a new case of its own—Hence, application as an intervenor in appeal could not be allowed. [Paras 20, 21 and 22]
By the Court.—We have heard Sri V.K.S. Chaudhary, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri B.N. Singh, Advocate on Intervener Application filed on behalf of Adhivakta Samanvay Samiti U.P. through its Secretary Sri R.K. Ojha, Advocate, Office at 198 Lukerganj, Allahabad, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant (in Special Appeal No. 517 of 2007) and Ch. N.A. Khan and other learned counsels appearing for the parties in all the connected matters.
2. The applicant has approached this Court with the prayer that it should be allowed to be heard in the above mentioned appeal alongwith other connected matters so that the applicant may support the judgment of Hon’ble Single Judge impugned in this appeal holding that Muslims are not entitled to be recognised as religious minority in the State of U.P. and accordingly, Madarsas run by Muslim communities are not entitled for grant-in-aid since they cannot be treated as minority religious institutions.
3. At the outset this Court enquired from the learned counsel for the applicant as to how this application is maintainable, inasmuch as, whether the applicant is supporting the petitioner or the respondents of the writ petition.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that he is supporting the judgment since it has decided an issue of national importance. Further, in respect to one prayer in the writ petition he is supporting the petitioner and in respect to the other prayer in the writ petition he is supporting the respondents though the grounds of support are absolutely different. He further submitted that since he is supporting the judgment on certain issues decided by Hon’ble Single Judge, therefore, the applicant is entitled to be heard in these appeal and the intervention deserved to be allowed.
5. In order to show the maintainability of the application reliance is placed on Chapter XXII Rule 5-A of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court Rules”) and Order I Rule 8-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the “CPC”). It is contended that though Order I Rule 8-A CPC provides that the Court may hear a person but the word ‘may’ in the facts and circumstances and the purpose for which the rule is made, is liable to be construed as ‘shall’. In support of the above submission reliance is placed on a passage from “Interpretation of Statutes” by Jagdish Swaroop and “Principles of Interpretation of Statutes” by G.P. Singh. Besides, Sri Chaudhary cited authority of the Apex Court in Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad and another v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, AIR 1985 SC 1622 (para 19); Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. CIT, 1999(3) SCC 141(para 12); State of Bihar and another v. Bal Mukund Sah and others, AIR 2000 SC 1296 (para 14); and Municipal Council Hansi, District Hissar v. Maniraj and others, AIR 2001 SC 1861 (para 6). He further argued that Section 107, CPC confers power upon the appellate Court which is possessed by the trial Court and, therefore, the provision of Order I Rule 8-A, C.P.C. would have application in Special Appeal also. Sri Chaudhary further argued that the applicant is trying to protect the public fund from being squandered by the State authorities for purposes other than public and national interest and it is his fundamental duty under Article 51-A of the Constitution of India to protect the same. Besides, such grant-in-aid to the institutions in question is also violative of Article 27 of the Constitution of India, therefore, the applicant is entitled to be heard in the matter and to advance his submissions.
6. On the contrary, all the parties in the appeals whether representing appellants or the respondents opposed the intervention application and contended that the applicant has no interest in the matter in issue in writ petition but certain issues which were not involved directly or otherwise in the writ petition but have been decided by Hon’ble Single Judge on his own and now to support