JUDGEMENT :- In this appeal by the plaintiffs only one point is involved and it is this whether the appellants have a right to flow dirty and rainy water of their house situate in No. 402 in village Godhna, Pargana Ghiswa, district Jaunpur towards the well of the respondents close to plot No. 403 at the north-eastern corner of the house of the respondents. The appellants filed suit for injunction on 29-10-1965.

2. On 28-8-1965, the respondent No. 1 filed a complaint against the two appellants and two other persons under Sections 277, 323 and 506 (later part) I.P.C. before the Nyaya Panchayat. On 30-10-1965 a compromise Ex. A-1 was filed by the parties. According to the compromise the appellants agreed not to flow their water towards plot No. 403 and near the well of Ram Dulare respondent.

3. Both the Courts below found that the plaintiffs-appellants have not acquired an easementary right to flow rainy and dirty water of their house towards plot No. 403 while recording this finding both the Courts below also attached importance to the compromise Ex. A-1.

4. The learned counsel for the appellants assailed the concurrent findings of the Courts below mainly on the ground that the compromise was wholly bad in law and the Courts below should not have taken it into consideration while recording a finding on the question of existence of easementary right.

5. The learned counsel for the respondents urged that this Court could not disturb the concurrent finding of fact on the question of alleged easementary right and that the said finding was not necessarily arrived at on the basis of compromise Ex. A-1. In this connection the learned counsel for the respondents also urged that there could be no easement in respect of a nuisance and that flowing of dirty water is nothing but a nuisance. Lastly, he contended that the compromise amounted to admission of the appellants and operated as an estoppel.

6. We find that both the Courts below have missed an important legal position with regard to the compromise. The complaint was filed under Ss.277, 323 and later part of S.506, I.P.C. A perusal of the complaint Ex. A-2 clearly shows that its allegations make out offences punishable under the said three Sections. Offences punishable under S.277 and later part of S.506, I.P.C. are not compoundable by the parties, not even with the permission of the court. (vide S.345 of the Criminal P.C., 1898).

7. In view of the above, the Nyaya Panchayat could not have accepted the compromise and could not have acted upon it.

8. There is statutory provision in Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act which lays down that an agreement/contract which is against the provisions of law or which is against public policy is void. The position of the present compromise is similar in nature. No compromise could be entered into in the criminal case against the express provisions of the Code which made offences under S.277 and later part of S.506, I.P. Code, non-compoundable. In this circumstance, the compromise was a document void ab initio and, therefore, it was not admissible in evidence nor it could be acted upon by a Court.

9. In this connection the contention of the respondents counsel that this compromise amounted to an admission and operated as an estoppel may be disposed of. According to the respondents counsel an admission is the best evidence which could be relied upon by the respondents as laid down in the case of Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi v. Gopal, AIR 1960 SC 100. There is no dispute to this legal position because admissions, if not proved to be erroneous or withdrawn, operate as estoppel as provided in S.31 of the Indian Evidence Act. Word "admission" has a technical meaning in law. It has been defined in S.17 of the Indian Evidence Act as a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact. The compromise does not show that the appellants admitted that their water was not used to flow towards plot No. 403 and the wel

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