1977 Supreme(All) 158
Allahbad High Court
YASHODANANDAN
Ganga Prasad - Appellant
Versus
Ram Saran - Respondent
Decided On : 07/11/1977
L.P. Singh, for Applicants; Vinod Chand Misra and Prahlad Upadhyaya, for Opposite Parties.
In an objection under O. 21, R. 100 of the CPC, the court is confined to deciding the question as to whether the objector was in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor. It cannot decide the question of jurisdiction of the court which executed the decree.
Headnote:
EXECUTION OF DECREE - JURISDICTION - OBJECTION UNDER O. 21, R. 100, C.P.C. - COURT TO DECIDE ONLY WHETHER OBJECTOR WAS IN POSSESSION ON HIS OWN ACCOUNT OR ON ACCOUNT OF SOME PERSON OTHER THAN JUDGMENT-DEBTOR - CANNOT DECIDE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION OF COURT WHICH EXECUTED DECREE.
Fact of the Case:
Decree-holders obtained delivery of possession of the property in dispute in execution of a partition decree. Ram Saran, who was dispossessed, filed an objection under O. 21, R. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), claiming that he was in possession as a tenant and not on behalf of the judgment-debtors. The objection was rejected by the trial court, but allowed by the revisional court on the ground that the executing court had no territorial jurisdiction over the property.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that in an objection under O. 21, R. 100 of the CPC, the court is confined to deciding the question as to whether the objector was in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor. It cannot decide the question of jurisdiction of the court which executed the decree.
Issues: Whether the court can decide the question of jurisdiction of the court which executed the decree in an objection under O. 21, R. 100 of the CPC.
Ratio Decidendi: The language of O. 21, R. 100 and O. 21, R. 101 of the CPC clearly indicates that the court's satisfaction is confined to the question as to whether the objector was in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor. O. 21, R. 101 does not contemplate the court deciding any other question in such proceedings.
Final Decision: The High Court allowed the revision petition, set aside the order of the revisional court, and restored the order of the trial court rejecting the objection.
2. Material facts giving rise to this revision are that House No. 47/99, Hatia, Kanpur was joint property of opposite parties 2 to 5. A suit for partition of this house was filed in the court of the 1st Civil Judge, Kanpur, who had territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. It was subsequently transferred to the court of the II Civil Judge, Kanpur who ultimately passed the decree in the suit. In that partition decree, the premises in dispute in the present proceedings, were allotted to the share of Ganga Prasad, Jamuna Prasad and Smt. Ram Kali, the applicants in the revision. They put the decree into execution and obtained delivery of possession of the property in question on the 5th April, 1969. Ram Saran, opposite party No. 1, filed an objection under O. 21, R. 100 of the Code in the court of the learned II Civil Judge, Kanpur against his dispossession from the premises in dispute on the ground that he was a person in occupation of the premises in dispute not through or on behalf of any of the judgment-debtors but was in possession in his own right as a tenant thereof. It was also contended by Ram Saran that since the subject-matter of the dispute was immovable property which was situate within the territorial jurisdiction of the court of learned I Civil Judge, Kanpur, the learned II Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to execute the decree passed by him in the capacity of a transferee court. The objections raised by Ram Saran failed to find favour with the learned II Civil Judge, Kanpur, who accordingly rejected them. Ram Saran filed a revision in the court of the learned District Judge, Kanpur, which was disposed of by the learned I Additional District Judge, Kanpur. The revision was filed only on the ground that the court of first instance had no jurisdiction to execute the decree because the subject-matter of the dispute was situate within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned I Civil Judge, Kanpur. It may be mentioned here that the learned II Civil Judge while disposing of the objection, recorded a clear finding of fact that Ram Saran was not the tenant of the premises in dispute and was not in possession in his own right.
3. The revision was allowed by the court below which set aside the order of the learned II Civil Judge, Kanpur, rejecting the objection of Ram Saran under O. 21, R. 100 of the Code. The court below directed Ram Saran to be restored to possession of the disputed premises and to be permitted to remain in possession thereof till the decree is put into execution in a court of competent jurisdiction. Aggrieved by the order of the court below, the decree-holders have filed this revision.
4. The only question urged by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant is that in an objection under Order 21, Rule 100 of the Code, the court concerned has to decide the objection on the assumption that the decree was passed by a court of competent jurisdiction and had also been executed by a court of competent jurisdiction. It was contended that in proceedings arising out of an objection under O. 21, R. 100 of the Code, the jurisdiction of the Court is confined to deciding the question as to whether the objector was in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor or not. It was urged that while deciding an objection under O. 21, R. 100 the Court can direct under O. 21, R. 101 that the objector be put into possession of the property only if it is satisfied that he was in possession of it on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor and not on the ground that the decree had been passed or executed by a court which had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the proceedings. It was submitted that in the instant case the learned Civil Judge,