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1977 Supreme(All) 91

Allahbad High Court
T.S.MISRA
Abdul Rahman - Appellant
Versus
Rameshwar Prasad - Respondent
Decided On : 04/07/1977

A party is not required to give notice to produce a document under Section 66 of the Evidence Act when the document is with a person not a party to the suit.

Headnote:

EVIDENCE ACT - SECTION 65, 66 - SECONDARY EVIDENCE - FOUNDATION FOR ADMISSION - NOTICE TO PRODUCE DOCUMENT - NOT REQUIRED WHEN DOCUMENT IS WITH A PERSON NOT A PARTY TO THE SUIT.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff claimed 11/16th share in the rent deposited under Section 7-C of the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Defendant No. 2 pleaded a family settlement and ownership of the shop. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the appellate court upheld the decision.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the defendant had laid a proper foundation for the admission of secondary evidence of the family settlement, as the original document was with Jumman, who was no longer alive, and not with the plaintiff or any other party to the suit.

Issues: Whether the defendant had laid a proper foundation for the admission of secondary evidence of the family settlement.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 65 of the Evidence Act, secondary evidence of the contents of a document may be given when the original is shown to be in the possession or power of a person not a party to the suit, and when, after notice mentioned in Section 66, such person does not produce it.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed.

JUDGMENT :- The facts leading to this appeal are these, According to the plaintiff the shop in dispute initially

belonged to one Madar Baksh, who expired in 1901. His brothers Idu and Jumman inherited his property in equal shares. The father of defendant No. 1 took that shop on rent from those persons, Idu died somewhere in the year 1931. Out of his share in the shop 1 anna share was inherited by his widow Smt. Baqridan, 3 annas by his brother Jumman, and 4 annas by his daughter Smt. Ramzani. Thus according to the plaintiff Jummans share in the shop became 11/16. Jumman was subsequently incapacitated and lost his power of understanding. The rent of the shop was, therefore, realised by defendant No. 3 and other relations of Jumman. Jumman died in the year 1942 survived by the plaintiff. Smt. Ramzani died in 1948, and Smt. Baqridan died in 1951. They were succeeded by defendants 3 to 5. On the death of Sarabjit his son defendant No. 1 became the tenant of the shop. When he failed to pay rent of the shop for the Period commencing 1-1-1966 a suit was filed. Defendant No. 1 deposited the rent under S. 7-C (2) of the U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act in Misc. Case No. 40 of 1967. The plaintiff then filed a suit claiming 11/16th share in the rent so deposited under S. 7-C of the Act.

2. The suit was resisted by the defendants. The contesting defendant No. 2 pleaded that the said shop was originally owned by Ramzan Ali, Mohd. Shafi, Ghulam Nabi alias Lallan who sold the same to defendant No. 2 on 28-1-1966 and since then the defendant had been in possession of the said shop as owner thereof. He further alleged that there had been a family settlement between Jumman, Dina, Badlu, Ramzani and Baqridan and the terms whereof were recorded in a deed dated 24-7-1931 registered on 7-10-1931. In pursuance of that family settlement Dina and Badlu became the owners of the shop and after the demise of Dina and Badlu Ramzan Ali, Mohd. Shafi and Ghulam Nabi alias Lallan became owners of the shop. They subsequently sold the said shop to defendant No. 2. The contesting defendant No. 2 therefore, pleaded that the plaintiff was not entitled to get any share in the amount of rent deposited under Section 7-C of the Act.

3. Defendants 3 to 5 admitted the plaintiffs case. The defendant No. 1 who was the tenant of the shop alleged that there was a bona fide dispute amongst the defendants as to who was the landlord of the shop, hence he deposited the rent under S. 7-C of the Act.

4. The trial Court, after considering the evidence on record, concluded that the plaintiff was not the owner of the shop in dispute; on the contrary defendant No. 2 was held to be its owner, hence the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court which was also dismissed. He has now come up to this court on second appeal.

5. It seems that before the appellate court below only one point was pressed, namely that the alleged family settlement set up by defendant No. 2 in his pleadings had not been proved in accordance with law. It was contended that the original deed of family Settlement had not been filed, and as its loss had not been proved the defendant No. 2 was not entitled to lead secondary evidence with regard to it. The submission therefore, was that the trial court had erred in placing reliance on the secondary evidence and as there was no valid proof of the family settlement, it could not be held that defendant No. 2 had become absolute owner of the said shop inasmuch as the transferees from whom he had purchased the property were not proved to be the sole owners. This contention did not find favour with the trial court.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant has pressed the same point over again in this second appeal. It was urged that in order to be entitled to adduce secondary evidence, the defendant No. 2 should have laid foundation for it by first proving that the original document was not in his possessio





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