K. B. ASTHANA, C. J.:- This is a revision against an order of the II Additional District Judge, Meerut passed in appeal from an order passed by the Prescribed Authority, Meerut under Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act (No. XIII of 1972), hereinafter to be called the Act.

2. The revisionist before us is a tenant in the accommodation in dispute and the opposite party is its landlord. The landlord filed an application under Section 21 of the Act before the Prescribed Authority for an order of eviction of the tenant from the accommodation occupied by him and for release of the accommodation in his favour. This application was resisted by the tenant. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the landlord, passed an order releasing the accommodation and ordering eviction of the tenant. The tenant then filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act before the District Judge. This appeal was dismissed. The tenant then filed this application under Section 115, C.P. Code in the High Court, questioning the validity and the propriety of the orders passed by the District Judge and the Prescribed Authority.

3. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the landlord opposite party to the effect that this application in revision is not maintainable as the proceedings do not arise from a suit within the meaning of that section of the Code and that Section 22 of the Act makes the appellate order of the District judge final and bars any further appeal or revision. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. We are of the opinion that the preliminary objection should prevail. On behalf of the landlord opposite party his learned counsel has drawn our attention to a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court rendered in Civil Revn. No. 981 of 1975 (Kundan Lal v. Smt, Dilawari Khatoon), decided on 20th January, 1976 (All), in which it has been held that no revision is maintainable in the High Court against an order passed by the District Judge in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act. On behalf of the tenant-applicant his learned counsel contended that an application under Section 21 of the Act is nothing but a suit and the law and the rules require it to be filed like a plaint under the Civil Procedure Code, and it is only a substitute for a regular suit, which ordinarily would have been filed by the landlord against the tenant for eviction after terminating the tenancy. It was submitted that Section 21 of the Act is nothing but a provision for the summary disposal of a suit for eviction of the tenant uninhibited by the technical procedure in the regular suit and without satisfying the condition precedent of termination of a tenancy by issue of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, but in all other respects it would be a proceeding of a civil nature, and where contested the prescribed Authority will have to frame issues, take evidence and determine the rights of the parties with reference to the grounds mentioned in the Act, which entitled the landlord for an order in his favour of eviction of the tenant. It was also contended on behalf of the applicant-tenant that under Sec.22 of the Act the provisions which have been enacted under sub-sec. (2) of Section 10 of the Act will be attracted to the appeal but not the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 10, inasmuch as the doctrine of mutatis mutandis would not be attracted to sub-sec. (3) of Section 10. That sub-section on its language would apply only to appeals filed against orders passed under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act.

4. We are unable to appreciate the second argument, mentioned above, that the doctrine of mutatis mutandis will only be attracted to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act and to an appeal under Section 22 of the Act but not to the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act. The doctrine of mutatis mutandis, as