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1972 Supreme(All) 292

Allahbad High Court
K.B.ASTHANA
Sheo Shankar - Appellant
Versus
Sub-Divisional Magistrate - Respondent
Decided On : 12/12/1972

Advocates:
R.C. Srivastava, for Petitioner; Standing Counsel, for Opposite Parties.

Headnote:

ARMS ACT - SECTION 17(3)(B), (C) - SUSPENSION OF LICENCE - REASONS - RELEVANCE - APPELLATE AUTHORITY - SCOPE OF REVIEW.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner's arms license was suspended by the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) on the ground that he was bound down to keep peace for a period of one year under Sections 107/117, Cr. P. C. The District Magistrate upheld the order on appeal. The petitioner challenged the orders by way of a writ petition under Article 226.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the SDO's order was not in conformity with the law as there was no material before him that it was necessary for the security of public peace or for public safety to disarm the petitioner. The court also held that the District Magistrate was not entitled to substitute a reason not given in writing by the SDO for taking action.

Issues: 1. Whether the SDO's order suspending the petitioner's license was vitiated due to the lack of a prior notice to show cause. 2. Whether the SDO's order was justified under Section 17(3)(b) of the Arms Act. 3. Whether the District Magistrate was entitled to substitute a reason not given in writing by the SDO for taking action.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the requirement of a prior notice to show cause is not an essential requirement for the exercise of the power to suspend or revoke a license under the Arms Act. The scheme under Sections 17 and 18 of the Arms Act is consistent with the basic principles of natural justice. 2. The court held that the SDO's order was not justified under Section 17(3)(b) of the Arms Act as there was no material before him that it was necessary for the security of public peace or for public safety to disarm the petitioner. 3. The court held that the District Magistrate was not entitled to substitute a reason not given in writing by the SDO for taking action.

Final Decision: The court allowed the petition, quashed the impugned orders of the SDO and the District Magistrate, and directed the petitioner to be entitled to his costs.

ORDER :- In March 1970 the petitioner was granted a licence for a double barrel gun. On some information having been laid before the Sub-Divisional Officer by the Superintendent of Police to the effect that the petitioner had been bound down to keep peace for a period of one year under Sections 107/117, Cr. P. Code, the Sub-Divisional Officer passed an order on 8-5-1970 suspending the licence and directed a show cause notice to issue to the petitioner why his licence be not cancelled. The petitioner appealed to the District Magistrate who upheld the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and dismissed the appeal. It is against these two orders, one passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer suspending the licence, and the second passed by the District Magistrate as an appellate authority that this petition under Article 226 is directed. It is prayed that the said two orders be quashed by a writ of certiorari as the orders are not in conformity with the law.

2. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the order suspending the licence passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 8-5-1970 was vitiated as no reasonable opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to show cause and no notice ever was served upon him that on the information laid by the Superintendent of Police the petitioner's licence was intended to be suspended and cancelled. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on a learned Single Judge's decision in Jugul Kishore v. District Magistrate, 1971 All WR (HC) 727 where it was held that a reasonable opportunity must be afforded before an order of suspension of arms licence can be passed. This view of the learned Judge also finds support from a Division Bench decision of this Court in Jai Narain Rai v. District Magistrate, Azamgarh, AIR 1966 All 265. But the Supreme Court has reiterated the law as to the scope and applicability of principles of natural justice in Union of India v. J. N. Sinha, AIR 1971 SC 40 as follows:

"Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights. Their aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it. If statutory provisions can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the Court should do so. But if a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any rule of natural justice, then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, in the nature of the power concerned, the principles for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power."

3. In view of what the Supreme Court has explained some doubt has arisen in my mind as to the correctness of the approach made in the two cases cited above decided by this Court in so far as the applicability of the principles of natural justice in the sphere of suspension and revocation of the licence under the Indian Arms Act is concerned.

4. It will be seen that sub-section (5) of Section 17 of the Arms Act requires an order in writing by the licencing authority recording the reasons for suspending or revoking a licence. There is no express provision in that section to give a prior notice to the licensee to show cause why his licence be not suspended or revoked as the case be. By Section 18 of the said Act the order passed by the licensing authority suspending or revoking the licence is made appealable and the requirement of sub-section (5) of that section is that no appeal shall be disposed of unless the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity of being he






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