Consent decree can be appealed under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Compromise decree can be set aside on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake, but only by a suit, not by appeal, review or motion.

ORDER :- This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, raises a point of law.

2. The dispute between the petitioners Chandra Shekhar, Sheo Shanker and Hari Shanker and the respondent Beni Madho and Harakh Narain and Shrimati Dhanpati and her minor sons Sheo Kumar, Om Prakash, Gyan Prakash, Anil Kumar and Rakesh Kumar related to the plots comprised in Khatas 3, 25 and 65, situate in Punpur, hamlet of village Kheda, in the district of Sultanpur. These Khatas comprised several plots including plots Nos.25, 37 and 1145. All the plots stood recorded in the name of Beni Madho, opposite party No.4. During the consolidation operations, the petitioners filed an objection before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, opposite party No.3. Similar objections were filed by Harakh Narain, opposite party No.5 and by Dhanpati on her own behalf and on behalf of her five minor sons. Dhanpati and her minor sons have not been impleaded as parties to this writ petition. Each objector claimed rights in the plots comprised in the said two Khatas. They entered into a compromise (Annexure 1) on January 21, 1967 and filed and verified the same before the Assistant Consolidation Officer. An order (Annexure 2), was passed by the said officer on the basis of the said compromise, on the same date. Not satisfied with this compromise to which Beni Madho was allegedly a party, he filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation on three grounds, namely, (1) that Beni Madho had not impleaded Dhanpati and her five minor sons who were parties to the compromise and which, therefore, could not be set aside in their absence from the array of parties, (2) that Beni Madho entered into the compromise and could not be permitted to go back upon that and (3) that the appeal was also barred by limitation. Beni Madho then filed a revision before the Director and this was allowed, the appellate order was set aside, the compromise was also set aside as a whole, and the case was remanded to the Consolidation Officer for inviting pleadings from each of the parties, framing issues, allowing opportunity to them to adduce evidence, and deciding the matter on merits by ignoring the compromise. It is in these circumstances that the present writ petition has been filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order passed by the Director of Consolidation.

3. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer founded on the compromise of the parties, was not an appealable or revisable order and, therefore, both the appeal and the revision were not competent. He placed reliance upon sub-section (3) of Section 96, Code of Civil Procedure which provides that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. It was pointed to him that Section 96 has no application to cases under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and the argument then advanced was that the provisions of Section 96 can in that case be applied by analogy. There appears to be no force in this contention inasmuch as even consent decrees have been made appealable under Section 11, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. This section says that any party to the proceedings under Section 9-A aggrieved by an order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer may, within 21 days of the date of the order, file an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. An Order passed on the compromise is an order under Section 9-A and, therefore there can be no escape from the conclusion that such an order was appealable.

4. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that a consent decree cannot be set aside in appeal, revision or review and besides it can be set aside only by a regular suit in the competent Civil Court. Sub-section (3) of Section 96, of the Code of Civil Procedure in so far as it bars an appeal from consent decrees, gives effect to the pri

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