A suit for cancellation of a sale deed under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act can only be maintained by a person against whom the instrument is void or voidable and who has a reasonable apprehension that the instrument, if left outstanding, will cause serious injury.

The facts giving rise to this appeal are briefly as follows: Respondent No.1 Smt. Maika and her two sons Bhika and Bhairon, respondents Nos. 2 and 3, filed a suit for cancellation of a certain sale deed in respect of the disputed land which was executed by Debi Prasad, appellant-defendant No.1, on 12-9-1963 in favour of appellants Nos.2 and 3 on the ground that the disputed land was purchased under a sale-deed by the husband of Smt. Maika and that ever since the purchase she along with her two sons Bhika and Bhairon had been in possession of the property and had planted trees over it. In this way the respondents claimed title not only to the land but also to the trees standing thereon and denied the title or possession of Debi Prasad to and over this property at any stage. Debi Prasad appellant had contested the suit along with his vendees, Debi Prasad claimed title, inter alia, on the ground of long adverse possession and one of the pleas raised by his vendees appellants Nos.2 and 3 was that they were vendees-purchasers of the property from him for value. The trial Court held that the plaintiffs-respondents had failed to establish that the disputed land was purchased by Chhotey Lal, deceased husband of Smt. Maika, and came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed to establish their title to the land.

It was found at the same time that appellant Debi Prasad also had been unable to prove that he had been in adverse possession over the property. There was a further finding that respondents Nos.2 and 3 were not vendees-purchasers, but still the trial Court awarded a decree for cancellation of the sale-deed in favour of the respondents on the sole basis that they were found to possess, what was described by the trial Court as, possessory title. The present appellants appealed and the first appellate Court also concurred in the finding of the trial court that neither the plaintiffs-respondents nor the appellant Debi Prasad had title to the property, the latter having failed to establish the plea of adverse possession, but relying on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Badri Narain Singh v. Kodo Sah, AIR 1915 Cal 423 held the plaintiffs-respondents entitled to a decree for cancellation of the sale-deed for having succeeded in showing themselves to be in possession of the property. The appeal was in the result dismissed with costs and. therefore, Debi Prasad and his two vendees have come to this Court in Second Appeal.

2. The learned counsel for the defendant-appellants made only one submission in the appeal. It was urged that the lower appellate Court misapplied the case of AIR 1915 Cal 423 and that under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, which was equivalent to Section 39 of the unamended Act, a decree for cancellation of an instrument could not be passed in favour of the respondents on the basis of possession, their title not having been established.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that a party is entitled to a decree for cancellation of an instrument even on the basis of possession no matter whether he has failed to establish his ownership to the disputed property. The learned counsel places reliance on the aforesaid Calcutta decision referred to by the lower appellate court.

4. Section 31(1) of the Specific Relief Act is in these terms:-

"31(1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled".

It is clear from a reading of Section 31(1) that a suit for cancellation of a written document can lie only at the instance of a person against whom the instrument is void or voidable and secondly who has a reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if l