KIRTY, J. :- The suit giving rise to this appeal was filed by the respondent for possession of a house and past, pendente lite and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs.10 per mensem. The trial Court decreed it in toto. The lower appellate Court confirmed the decree for possession upholding the plaintiff's title, but remanded the case to the trial Court for deciding the question of mesne profits afresh after framing a specific issue thereon. The defendant filed an appeal in this Court, registered as F.A.F.O. 237 of 1965, under Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal came up before Verma, J. (as he then was) for final hearing. He considered the points of law involved in the case to be of sufficient importance meriting decision by a Division Bench and ordered accordingly.

2. Thereafter the appeal was heard by Oak, C.J. and Mukerji, J. Before them a preliminary objection was raised by the respondent as to the maintainability of appeal under the provisions under which it had been filed. This objection was upheld by the Bench, but at the request of the appellant, permission and time was granted to convert the appeal into a regular second appeal under Section 100 of the Code. Necessary steps in that behalf having been taken by the appellant, the appeal was registered as Second Appeal No.1623 of 1971, and has thereafter been heard by this Bench.

3. The plaintiff's title and claim are founded on a sale deed dated 14-10-1957 executed in her favour by Smt. Dhanki, mother of the defendant. She pleaded inter alia that she had acquired absolute ownership under the sale deed. The execution of the sale deed is not denied. The question is as to the nature and extent of title and right which could be and had been conveyed to her by Smt. Dhanki, and whether she is entitled to recover possession by evicting the defendant from the house. The sale deed apparently is a conveyance of absolute title.

4. The house admittedly was originally owned by one Tirhoo, who died some forty or fifty years before the suit leaving behind a widow, Smt. Binda and a daughter, Smt. Dhanki. The widow inherited the house and on her death it devolved on Smt. Dhanki. The latter had at first been married to a Hindu but subsequently she married a Muslim after renouncing Hindu religion and embracing Islam. She inherited the property after her conversion. The defendant, Fakir Bux is Smt. Dhanki's son by her Muslim husband. He was born in the house and had been living therein with his mother since then. These in brief are the material facts, either admitted or proved, which are no longer assailable. The pleas of the defendant that he has been in adverse possession of the house for more than twelve years before the institution of the suit and that it is therefore barred by limitation have been negatived. The appellant has not shown that those findings suffer from any error of law. Eventually, the appellant's possession was merely as a licencee of his mother. It is in the context of these facts and circumstances that the appeal has to be decided.

5. The courts below have held that by virtue of the provisions of the Caste Disabilities Removal Act (XXI of 1850) Smt. Dhanki in spite of her conversion to Mahomedan religion inherited the house as Tirhoo's daughter and that she became its absolute owner under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act (XXX of 1956) when that Act came into force. The plaintiff, therefore, acquired absolute title to the house under the sale deed executed by Smt. Dhanki in her favour. The points for consideration in the appeal are whether the legal questions arising in the case have been decided correctly by the courts below and whether the suit could be legally decreed.

6. Act XXI of 1850 contains one substantive Section, viz., Section 1. The preamble forms an integral prelude to the main section. Together they run thus:

"Whereas it is enacted by Section 9, Regulation VII, 1832, of the Bengal Code that whenever