JUDGMENT :- This is the defendant's second appeal.

2. This dispute in this case relates to a house situate in the district of Gonda of which the respondent Abdul Wahab is the landlord and in which the appellant Mushiyat Ullah has been living as a tenant on his behalf. The respondent brought a suit against the appellant Mushiyat Ullah for ejectment of this house and for recovery of arrears of rent alleging that he had sent a registered notice on 10-4-1969 at the Gorakhpur address of the appellant which was received back with an endorsement of refusal by the postman. The suit was resisted on a variety of grounds, one of which was that no notice, as alleged for the respondent-plaintiff, was ever served upon the appellant nor was it ever refused by him. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to notice the other grounds of defence. The trial Court raised a presumption of service of the notice under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and decreed the suit for ejectment with costs. On appeal, the judgment and the decree of the trial Court were affirmed and, therefore, the defendant comes to this Court.

3. The appeal raises a short question. The learned Counsel for the appellant canvassed only one point: It was urged that the courts below were wrong in raising the presumption of service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the basis of Section 27 of the U.P. General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The learned Counsel pointed out that although it was held by a Full Bench of this Court in Ganga Ram v. Smt. Phulwati, 1970 All WR (HC) 198 : (AIR 1970 All 446 (FB)) that when it is found that a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was sent by registered post by the landlord to the correct address of the tenant, but was received back by the landlord undelivered with an endorsement made by some one in the post office that the addressee had refused to take the notice on a particular day, the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act as well as Section 27 of the General Clauses Act about service of such a notice can be rightly made in law, but the learned Counsel points out that it was held by the Full Bench that this presumption of law under S.27 of the General Clauses Act and the presumption of fact under S. 114 of the Evidence Act were not conclusive but were rebuttable presumptions and according to the learned Counsel the error of the Lower Appellate Court lays in not applying its mind to the question whether the presumptions which arose under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act had been rebutted by the defendant-appellant's sworn statement. The second submission of the learned Counsel in this connection is that no presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act could arise in law in the present case as the property in dispute was situate in the district of Gonda, which was the place of permanent residence of the appellant, and the notice admittedly was not sent by his permanent address but by the Gorakhpur address. In other words, the argument is that for a presumption to arise under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act, the notice must be shown to have been sent by permanent address of the tenant.

To take the last point first, I find no warrant for the submission that the presumption which arises under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act must be confined to cases where the registered notice was sent by a permanent address of the tenant and was received back undelivered by the landlord with an endorsement of refusal by the postman. At any rate, this argument is not supported by any observation made in the Full Bench case of Ganga Ram v. Smt. Phulwati (Supra). In that case the Court held that the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of

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