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Allahbad High Court
M.N.SHUKLA
B. P. Sinha - Appellant
Versus
Som Nath - Respondent
Decided On : 07/16/1970
LEASE - TENANCY - AGREEMENT TO LEASE - LEASE FOR LIFETIME - PART PERFORMANCE - ESTOPPEL - U. P. CONTROL OF RENT AND EVICTION ACT - REGISTRATION ACT - TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT - INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant was a tenant in the main bunglow of the respondent. The respondent wanted to let out the bunglow to the Accountant-General and requested the appellant to shift to the accommodation in suit on the same terms and conditions as applied to the previous tenancy. The appellant agreed and shifted to the accommodation in suit pursuant to a letter written by the respondent (Exhibit A-3). The appellant continued to pay rent regularly. The respondent filed a suit for ejectment of the appellant and for recovery of arrears of rent.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the letter Exhibit A-3 was an agreement to lease and not the contract of lease itself. The court further held that the lease created in favour of the appellant was a lease for lifetime and that the appellant was entitled to the protection of the proviso to Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act and also that the plea of part performance embodied in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was available to him. The court also held that the plaintiff's suit was barred by the principle of estoppel.
Issues: 1. Whether the letter Exhibit A-3 was an agreement to lease or the contract of lease itself? 2. Whether the lease created in favour of the appellant was a lease for lifetime? 3. Whether the appellant was entitled to the protection of the proviso to Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act and also that the plea of part performance embodied in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was available to him? 4. Whether the plaintiff's suit was barred by the principle of estoppel?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the letter Exhibit A-3 was an agreement to lease and not the contract of lease itself, as it did not specify any definite period of tenancy and reserved to the lessee the right to vacate the premises whenever he chose. 2. The court held that the lease created in favour of the appellant was a lease for lifetime, as it was evident from the letter Exhibit A-3 that the intention of the parties was to create a lease for lifetime and that the purpose of the tenancy was to allow the use of the accommodation for residential purposes. 3. The court held that the appellant was entitled to the protection of the proviso to Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act and also that the plea of part performance embodied in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was available to him, as the appellant had entered into possession of the premises pursuant to the letter Exhibit A-3 and had continued in possession thereon. 4. The court held that the plaintiff's suit was barred by the principle of estoppel, as the appellant had vacated the accommodation which was earlier in his tenancy at the request of the landlord in order to enable the latter to let out that accommodation to another tenant and having on the request of the landlord altered his position and vacated the portion in his tenancy and shifted to the one in dispute, the plaintiff was estopped in law from taking the position which was at variance with the terms of the agreement which preceded the lease.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed with costs.
2. In defence the appellant contended that he was originally a tenant in the main bunglow and the plaintiff wanted to let out the same to the Accountant-General, U. P., and so requested the appellant to shift to the accommodation in suit on the same terms and conditions as applied to the previous tenancy, that the plaintiff assured the defendant that the latter could live as long as he desired and receive the same facilities which he had enjoyed in the previous accommodation. It was pleaded that the suit was barred by the principle of estoppel and also by the terms of the agreement of lease which were contained in a letter. The appellant stated that he continued to pay rent regularly and had not rendered himself liable to eviction.
3. The plaintiff's suit was dismissed by the trial Court. He preferred an appeal which was allowed by the learned Civil Judge, who decreed the plaintiff's suit. Aggrieved by the same the defendant has preferred this second appeal.
4. The cardinal point to be decided in this case is as to whether the respondent was entitled to eject the appellant in view of the agreement between the parties as expressed in the plaintiff's letter dated 17-6-1958 (Exhibit A-3). The first subsidiary question on which ultimately the decision of this point would depend is as to the nature of the tenancy which came into existence subsequent to this letter. It may be made clear at this very stage that the stand of the appellant with regard to this letter is that it was an agreement to lease property and not the contract of the lease itself. That contention is borne out by the pleadings of the defendant in paragraph 26 of the written statement. It is the admitted case of the parties that the appellant was a tenant of the plaintiff in a portion of the main bunglow, the plaintiff wanted to let out that bunglow to the Accountant-General and as such requested the appellant to shift to the accommodation in suit to which the defendant agreed. It was in this connection that the plaintiff wrote the letter aforesaid (Exhibit A-3) to the defendant, which is the sheet anchor of the appellant in the present case. The letter may be rendered into English as follows :-
"I want to let out my entire bunglow in the western corner of which you live to the A. G.'s Office, I hope you will vacate this. In place of this you will please go to the house behind this Kothi. You will pay Rs. 40/- per month as rent of that and in that you can live as long as you desire and you will receive the same facility which you had in the old house."
5. A perusal of this letter makes it abundantly clear that it was really speaking an agreement to lease. Relying on its terms the appellant submitted that a lease for lifetime was created in favour of the appellant. It is not disputed that the appellant was ?(Complete line) was paying rent of the same to the plaintiff who accepted it in the capacity of a lessor. In other words, the relationship of lessor and lessee is admitted to have come into existence between the parties. The contention of the respondent is that a construction of this letter would lead to the conclusion that a permanent tenancy came into existence. According to the appellant on the other hand, the contents of this letter mili
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