PATHAK J. : I agree that the appeal must be dismissed. And in view of the importance of the questions raised, I propose to set out my reasons.

2. The facts are already set put in the judgment of my brother Gulati and I need not repeat them, here.

3. The appellant has raised three questions before us.

4. The first contention is that the judgment of this Court in Special Appeal No. 473 of 1960 operates as res judicata and this appeal should also be disposed of on the ground which found favour there. I cannot agree. That case was taken in appeal to the Supreme Court, and the appeal was allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh petition. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that any finding in the appeal concludes the questions raised before us. The Supreme Court expressed no opinion on the merits of the points raised in the appeal and cannot be taken, therefore, to have approved of what was decided by this Court. Indeed while allowing the appeal to be withdrawn it expressly granted liberty to the respondent to file a fresh petition. The first contention is rejected.

5. The second contention is that the findings of the Administrative Tribunal and its consequent recommendation are not matters amenable to certiorari inasmuch as there is no error of law apparent on the face of the record. The submission, I think proceeds on a misconception of the true nature of the case set up by the respondent. The case of the respondent is that there was no jurisdiction in the Tribunal to take the proceedings which it did because the reference made to it by the Governor fell outside the scope of R. 4 of the U. P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal Rules, 1947. Rule 4 empowers the Governor to refer to the Tribunal only cases in respect of matters involving (a) corruption, (b) failure to discharge duties properly, (c) irremediable general inefficiency in a public servant of more than ten years standing and (d) personal immorality. The respondent says that cases which do not fall within any of these four clauses cannot be referred at all to the

Tribunal, and, he contends, the present is such a case. When it is plain from the language of R. 4 that the Governor has power to refer cases to the Tribunal of specified categories only he has no power to refer leases which do not fall within those categories. The charges framed against the respondent were to the effect that he was guilty of personal immorality and had failed to discharge his duties properly. If the particulars framing the basis of the charges cannot reasonably be said to constitute personal immorality or failure to discharge duties properly, clearly the case could not have been referred to the Tribunal and the Tribunal could have had no jurisdiction in the matter. It is settled law that a writ in the nature of certiorari may be issued where the impugned order either suffers from jurisdictional error or is vitiated by a manifest error of law or there is a breach of the principles of natural justice. Any one of these considerations would open the door to the grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari, consequently the submission that relief should be refused because the findings of the Tribunal are not manifestly illegal must be rejected if otherwise it is found that the reference of the case to the Tribunal and the proceedings consequently taken by the Tribunal are without jurisdiction.

6. The last contention is that upon the findings of the Tribunal the respondent must be considered to be guilty of personal immorality and to have failed to discharge his duties properly. It is urged that the finding of the learned single Judge to the contrary is erroneous. Now personal immorality has been defined by rule 2(e) as follows :

" 'Personal immorality' means 'vicious habits relating to drink, sex and gambling which reduce the utility of a public servant so as to damage Government or the official generally in public esteem."

Therefore, there must first be a vicious h