JUDGMENT: This application purporting to have been filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains a prayer that the delay of one week in depositing the costs in compliance with my order dated 14-5-1970 may be condoned and the consequential order resulting in the dismissal of the restoration application for this non-compliance may be set aside and that the restoration application may be revived.

2. The facts of the case were that the Second Appeal No. 858 of 1961 was dismissed in default of the appellants on 1-8-1969. The appellants then applied for restoration of this appeal and that application was allowed by me conditionally on 14-5-1970 in the following terms:-

"In the interest of justice, I allow this application on payment of Rs. 30/-as costs which shall be paid within a week from this date. If the costs are paid within the time allowed the second appeal shall be restored to its original number. In case of default in the payment of costs, this application shall stand dismissed."

3. The costs were not paid within the time allowed and so the application for restoration stood dismissed on 21-5-1970. Thereafter the appellants' counsel paid Rs. 30/- to respondents' counsel on 29-5-1970 and obtained a receipt from them. On 20-7-1970 the present application was made under Section 151, Civil P. C.

4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that though the case would not be covered by Section 143, Civil P. C. this court can exercise its inherent power under S. 151 to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioners. In this connection he refers to a decision of the Supreme Court in Mahant Ram Das v. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 SC 882 in which it was held that where a Bench of the High Court, while deciding an appeal in favour of the appellant, passed a peremptory order fixing the period for payment of deficit court-fee, and the appellant made an application for extension of time before the time fixed had run out, but the application came on for hearing before a Division Bench after the period had run out, the High Court was not powerless to enlarge the time even though it had peremptorily fixed the period for payment. In that case the order fixing time for payment of the court-fee was, no doubt, a peremptory order like the order dated 14-5-1970 passed by me and provided that in default of payment of court-fee within the time fixed, the appeal shall stand dismissed, but the appellant had moved an application praying for further time before the time so fixed had run out and it was on account of the circumstances beyond his control that this application could not be disposed of on that very day and it came before a Division Bench for hearing after that time had run out. On those facts it was held that even after the original time had run out the Court was not powerless to extend the time on the basis of the application that had been made prior to the fixed time running out and that in such a case the order so passed would be deemed to take effect from the date on which the application had been made for further extension of time. In the present case, as noted above, no such application for extension of time was given before the time fixed in the peremptory order had completely run out. The application was nade more than two months thereafter. The peremptory order, which was a self-contained order, came into operation when the costs had not been paid till 21-5-1970. On these facts neither Section 148 nor S. 149 would be applicable nor the time can be extended under the inherent powers under Section 151. The Bench decision of this court in Gaya Din v. Lalta Prasad (AIR 1936 All 477) is directly an authority on the point before us. In this case it was held that if the condition laid down in the peremptory order is not complied with within the time fixed in that order, and in the event of non-compliance, the order operates automatically and without further intervention of the

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