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1967 Supreme(All) 34

Allahbad High Court
SATISHCHANDHA
Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Central Zonal Office, Kanpur - Appellant
Versus
City Munsif. Meerut - Respondent
Decided On : 03/24/1967

Advocates:
S.D. Agarwal and J. Swarup, for Petitioners; A.D. Prabhakar, for Respondent.

Headnote:

ADVOCATES ACT, 1961 - SECTION 30 - INTERPRETATION - RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION BY ADVOCATE - EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO APPOINT AN AGENT - PERSONAL CHARACTER OF THE RIGHT - INQUIRING OFFICER NOT LEGALLY AUTHORISED TO TAKE EVIDENCE - NO RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION BY ADVOCATE.

Fact of the Case:

An employee of the Life Insurance Corporation of India was charged with fraud, criminal misappropriation, and criminal breach of trust. An Advocate, Sri Krishnadeo Sharma, requested the Inquiring Officer to allow him to represent the employee, but the request was denied. Sri Sharma filed a suit in the court of City Munsif, Meerut, for a permanent injunction restraining the petitioners from interfering with his right to represent the employee in the enquiry proceedings.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the Inquiring Officer was not a tribunal or a person legally authorised to take evidence, as he was not empowered by law to summon witnesses and compel production of documents. Therefore, Sri Sharma was not entitled to practice before the Inquiring Officer as a matter of right under Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

Issues: 1. Whether the Inquiring Officer was a tribunal or a person legally authorised to take evidence? 2. Whether Sri Sharma had a right to represent the employee in the enquiry proceedings?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted the phrase "legally authorised" in Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, to mean that the tribunal or person must have been authorised by a statute or statutory rules to take evidence. 2. The court held that the employee did not have a common law right to appoint a counsel as his agent, and that the right to defend himself against the charges and show cause against the proposed action was personal in character and could not be exercised by an agent.

Final Decision: The petition was allowed, the proceedings in suit no. 1065 of 1966 were quashed, and the City Munsif, Meerut, was prohibited from proceeding with it.

ORDER :- This is a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution. It prays for prohibition commending the Munsif, Meerut, not to proceed with a suit filed by the second respondent against the petitioner and for quashing the proceedings.

2. The petitioners are the officers of Life Insurance Corporation of India. On 6th July, 1964 a charge sheet was served on R.C. Anand, an assistant in the Stores and Stationery Department of the Divisional Office, Life Insurance Corporation of India at Meerut, Sri Anand was charged with acts of fraud, criminal misappropriation and criminal breach of trust in respect of goods and articles of the Life Insurance Corporation. He was afforded an opportunity of explanation. The Inquiring Officer commenced the enquiry on 9th February, 1965. Sri Krishnadeo Sharma, Advocate, Meerut requested the Inquiring Officer for permission to appear before him and represent the case of Sri R.C. Anand. The Inquiring Officer refused permission on the ground that under the rules Sri Anand was not entitled to be represented by an Advocate. Sri Krishnadeo Sharma repeated his request but was again refused permission to appear. While the enquiry was proceeding Sri Sharma instituted a suit (No. 1065 of 1966) in the court of City Munsif, Meerut against the petitioners for a permanent injunction restraining them from interfering with Sri Sharma's right to represent Sri Anand in the enquiry proceedings. In the plaint it was stated that Sri Anand had engaged Sri Sharma as his legal counsel for representing and pleading for him in the enquiry proceedings. Sri Sharma alleged that he was a practising Advocate and was on the common rolls of Advocates of the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh and as such was entitled to practise before any tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence. The enquiry officer, who was a defendant to the suit was legally authorised to take evidence and was actually doing so and so, Sri Sharma was entitled to appear before the Inquiring Officer. On 8th December, 1966 the learned Munsif issued an ad interim injunction restraining the petitioners from conducting the enquiry without allowing the plaintiff Advocate to represent the charged employee. The petitioners alleged that the suit is not maintainable and the entire proceedings are without jurisdiction and void. The petitioners case is that the respondents have misunderstood the provisions of Section 30 of the Advocates Act and on a true reading thereof Sri Sharma had no cause of action and the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or to issue an injunction.

3. The question at the threshold, therefore, relates to the interpretation of Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961. This provision reads :

"30. Subject to the provisions of this Act, every advocate whose name is entered in the common roll shall be entitled as of right to practise throughout the territories to which this Act extends, -

(i) in all courts including the Supreme Court.

(ii) before any tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence; and

(iii) before any other authority or person before whom such advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practise."

For the respondents reliance is placed upon the second clause of this section;. It is urged that the Inquiring Officer was a tribunal or a person. He was legally authorised to take evidence. For the petitioners it is urged that the Life Insurance Corporation of India or the regulations made thereunder do not authorise the Inquiring Officer to take evidence. It is contended that before a person can be said to be legally authorised to take evidence he must have been conferred authority by law to summon witnesses and compel production of documents.

4. It is to be noticed that Section 30 used the word "legally". It is to be distinguished from "lawful". In Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition Vol. 24 p. 525) it is stated that legal ''looks more to the letter, and lawful to the spirit, of the law". Le















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