1968 Supreme(All) 84

Allahbad High Court
JAGDISHSAHAL,GANGESHWARPRASAD,S.D.SINGH
Raja Ram Verma - Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. - Respondent
Decided On : 05/24/1968

Headnote:

The U.P. Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act XIII of 1959 (the Act) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and is, consequently, void. The Act discriminates amongst persons in occupation of Government land inter se by leaving it to the unguided and unfettered choice of the State to take ordinary legal proceedings in the civil or the revenue Court against some of them and to resort to the more drastic provisions of the Act against others.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners were in occupation of certain plots of land in District Naini Tal. The plots were situate in village Nagla Tarai Tahsil Khatima (Writ Petition No. 3755) and village Rahpura Tehsil Kaichha (Writ Petition No. 3756). The U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act of 1950 did not apply to the areas in which the plots were situate and they were governed by the U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939. Proceedings for the eviction of the petitioners from the aforesaid plots were started under the provisions of the Act. The Public Authority constituted under the Act issued notices to the petitioners under Sec. 3 of the Act calling upon them to show cause why orders of eviction be not passed against them in respect of the plots in their occupation. The petitioners filed objections contending, inter alia, that the Act was ultra vires the Constitution and that in any case they had acquired rights of hereditary tenants in the plots and were, therefore, not liable to eviction under the provisions of the Act. The objections were, however, rejected by the Public Authority and orders of eviction were passed by him against the petitioners. Appeals against the orders of the Public Authority were then preferred by the petitioners to the District Judge Naini Tal under Section 5 of the Act. After hearing elaborate arguments on behalf of the parties on the objections raised by the petitioners, the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the Act was intra vires, that the petitioners were in unauthorised occupation of the disputed plots and had not acquired rights of hereditary tenants therein, and that they were liable to be evicted under the provisions of the Act. He, accordingly, affirmed the orders of the Public Authority and dismissed the appeals. The petitioners, thereupon, filed these petitions, praying for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Public Authority and those of the District Judge arid also praying for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to the petitions not to interfere in any manner with the possession of the petitioners over the plots in dispute.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and is, consequently, void. The Court also held that the Act discriminates amongst persons in occupation of Government land inter se by leaving it to the unguided and unfettered choice of the State to take ordinary legal proceedings in the civil or the revenue Court against some of them and to resort to the more drastic provisions of the Act against others.

Issues: 1. Whether the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution? 2. Whether the Act discriminates amongst persons in occupation of Government land inter se?

Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and is, consequently, void. The Court also held that the Act discriminates amongst persons in occupation of Government land inter se by leaving it to the unguided and unfettered choice of the State to take ordinary legal proceedings in the civil or the revenue Court against some of them and to resort to the more drastic provisions of the Act against others. The Court relied on the following principles: 1. The rule of construction is that where a statute provides in express terms that its enactment will repeal an earlier Act by reason of its inconsistency with such earlier Act, the latter may be treated as repealed. 2. Even where the later Act does not contain such express words, if the co-existence of the two sets of provisions is destructive of the object with which the later Act was passed, the Court would treat the earlier provision as impliedly repealed. 3. A later Act which confers a new right would repeal an earlier right if the fact of the two rights coexisting together produces inconvenience, for, in such a case it is legitimate to infer that the legislature did not intend such a consequence. 4. If the two Acts are general enactments and the later of the two is couched in negative terms, the inference would be that the earlier one was impliedly repealed. 5. Even if the later statute is in affirmative terms, it is often found to involve that negative which makes it fatal to the earlier enactment.

Final Decision: Both the writ petitions were allowed. The orders of the Public Authority and the District Judge Naini Tal impugned thereby were quashed.