SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

1966 Supreme(All) 51

Allahbad High Court
S.K.VERMA
Punjab Lime and Lime-stone Co., Dehradun - Appellant
Versus
Cantonment Board, Dehradun - Respondent
Decided On : 02/28/1966

Advocates:
S.C. Khare and A.B. Saran, for Petitioner; V. Swaroop and K. Swaroop, for Respondents.

The power to impose a toll is conferred upon Cantonment Boards by a valid existing law and is saved by Article 372 of the Constitution.

Headnote:

CANTONMENTS ACT - SECTION 60 - TOLL LEVY - VALIDITY - INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS - FREEDOM OF TRADE AND COMMERCE - ARTICLE 301 OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Fact of the Case:

Petitioners, who leased a lime-stone quarry in Dehradun, challenged the validity of toll levied by the Cantonment Board on their trucks transporting lime-stone from the quarry to the railway station. They argued that the toll was not a valid levy as the Cantonment Board rendered no service, that the word "entering" in the relevant provision meant more than merely passing through, and that the levy contravened Article 301 of the Constitution.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the toll levy was valid and did not contravene Article 301 of the Constitution. It interpreted the word "entering" in the relevant provision to mean simply "passing through" and found that the Cantonment Board did render services in relation to the road upon which the petitioners' trucks passed. The court also held that the power to impose the toll was conferred upon the Cantonment Board by a valid existing law and was saved by Article 372 of the Constitution.

Issues: 1. Whether the toll levy by the Cantonment Board was a valid exercise of its powers under the Cantonments Act? 2. Whether the word "entering" in the relevant provision meant more than merely passing through? 3. Whether the toll levy contravened Article 301 of the Constitution?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted the relevant provisions of the Cantonments Act and concluded that the Cantonment Board had the power to impose the toll. It held that the word "entering" in the relevant provision meant simply "passing through" and that the Cantonment Board did render services in relation to the road upon which the petitioners' trucks passed. 2. The court held that the toll levy did not contravene Article 301 of the Constitution as it was saved by Article 372 of the Constitution.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the petitions with costs.

ORDER :- These are two connected writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners in the two cases have taken a lease of lime-stone quarry situate at Bhitarli in the District of Dehradun. The lime which is taken out of the quarry is taken to the railway station of Dehradun in trucks. While going from the quarry to the railway station the trucks have to pass over a road within the limits of the Cantonment Board of Dehradun. The Cantonment Board has erected barriers for the purpose of realising toll on the trucks passing through the Cantonment Area. The petitioners challenged the validity of the toll levied on their vehicles. They filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) Dehradun. They thereupon filed a suit for an injunction restraining the Cantonment Board from realising the toll but the suit was also dismissed. They have, therefore, filed these petitions. They pray that a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari be issued, quashing the notification No. S. R. O. 369 dated 1st of November, 1963, sanctioning the levy of toll tax under section 60 of the Cantonments Act. The further prayer is that a writ or direction in the nature of mandamus be issued directing the respondent Board not to realise toll tax from the petitioners on goods and laden vehicles in transit.

2. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the word ' toll' presupposes the rendering of some service by the authority realising the toll and as the Cantonment Board renders no service, what has been levied by it is not toll. There is no allegation in the petition to the effect that the Cantonment Board renders no service. The relevant paragraph is number ' 3 which reads thus :

" 3. That as such while transporting the lime-stone from the quarry of the petitioner the Trucks have to pass through the limits of Cantonment Board Dehradun. But they are never loaded or unloaded within the Cantonment Board limits. They merely pass through the Cantonmenl Board to their destinations outside it, that too on M. E. S. Road and not on any road of the Cantonment Board. "

All that has been alleged is that the road is ' M. E. S., Road ' and not a road of the Cantonment Board. The reply to paragraph ' 3 of the petition is to be found in paragraph five of the counter affidavit Paragraph five of the counter affidavit reads as follows :

" That in paragraph 3 of the writ-petition it is only admitted that some limestone trucks do pass through the limits of cantonment Board Dehradun Rest of the paragraph is not admitted. The road referred to as the M. E. S., Road is within the Cantonment Board limits. "

3. It will thus be seen that there is no assertion by the petitioners to the effect that the Cantonment Board renders no service. This question arose in Hindustan Vanaspati Manufacturing Co. Ltd., v. Municipal Board, Ghaziabad, AIR 1962 All 25. The facts were that the appellant Company's premises at Gaziabad were situate within the limits of the Ghaziabad Municipal Board. The Board claimed that it was entitled to levy a toll under section 128 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, on the railway wagons bringing supplies to the appellant company's factory and to collect the amount thereof from the appellant company. The latter disputed its liability to pay. There were certain criminal proceedings started against the appellant company and eventually a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was filed in this Court. Mootham, C. J., was of the opinion that the tax in question was not a toll. Raghubar Dayal. J., took a different view and the matter was eventually laid before A. P. Srivastava, J., to whom the following question was referred for answer :

" Whether the tax which the respondent-Board is seeking to impose on the appellant is a toll. "

4. The argument was that there must be some quid pro quo or consideration to support the levy. A. P. Srivastava, J., agreed with Rag



































































Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top