ORDER : On the 3rd of April, 1961 applicant filed a complaint before a Magistrate First Class at Meerut on the allegations that he was the Bhumidhar of plots Nos. 836, 837 and 821 of village Shafiabad, that in pursuance of a conspiracy amongst themselves, the opposite parties with a view to cause loss to the applicant got a fictitious sale-deed in respect of the aforesaid plots executed and registered in favour of opposite party No. 1 on 9th January 1981 for alleged consideration of Rs. 2000/- and on the basis of that forged deed opposite party No. 2 moved an application for mutation of plots before the Tahsildar Hapur and thereby they had all committed offences under Sections 467 and 471 I.P.C.

2. The learned Magistrate was of opinion that as the allegations made in the complaint indicated that the alleged offences were committed in relation to a proceeding before the court of the Tahsildar, the complaint was barred by Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He, therefore, dismissed it without framing any charge against the accused. The applicant came up in revision against that order before the learned Sessions Judge but it was dismissed. Hence this revision.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant has raised several contentions in support of this revision. He has argued that a Tahsildar dealing with a mutation case is not a revenue court within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code and that as the offence of forgery was complete when a fictitious sale-deed was executed and registered, the subsequent filing of an application by one of the opposite parties on its basis for mutation before the Tahsildar should not have influenced the courts below for holding that the complaint was barred under Section 195 of the

Code.

Learned counsel has further argued that in any case as opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 were not parties to the mutation proceedings, the order of the courts below holding the complaint barred against them also under Section 195 Cr. P.C. is not sustainable. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Nilman Singh v. Rudra Partap Narain Singh, reported in AIR 1926 PC 100. I, however, find no force in these contentions.

4. In the case referred to by the learned counsel it was held by the Privy Council that mutation proceedings.

"are much more in the nature of fiscal inquiries instituted in the interest of the State for the purpose of ascertaining which of the several claimants for the occupation of certain denominations of immovable property may be put into occupation of it with greater confidence that the revenue for it will be paid."

and that it was an error to suppose that such proceedings are "judicial proceedings in which the title to and the proprietary rights in immovable property are determined."

These observations no doubt indicate that a Tahsildar dealing with mutation proceedings may not be a court, but that was not a question in issue before their Lordships and the observations were made only to emphasize the fact that mutation proceedings do not decide the rights of the parties finally. This case, in my opinion, is not an authority for the proposition that the Tahsildar is not a revenue court.

5. Revenue laws and the courts which administer them are mostly the creatures of the respective State Legislatures. Section 4, Sub-clause (8) of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901 reads :

"(8) "Revenue Court" means all or any of the following authorities (that is to say), the Board and all members thereof, Commissioner, Additional Commissioners. Collectors, Additional Collectors. Assistant Collectors, Settlement Officers, Assistant Settlement Officers, Record Officers and Assistant Record Officers and Tahsildars";

6. Section 5 of the aforesaid Act provides that the control of all non-judicial matters converted with the land revenue is vested in the State Government and the control of all judicial Matters is vested in the Board. The orders passed by a Tahsildar in m

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