S. K. VERMA, J. :- In Faulad v. State, 1961 All LJ 244 : (AIR 1961 All 326), a Division Bench of this Court, consisting of V.G. Oak and Kailash Prasad JJ., took the view that, until a judgment is signed and sealed after delivery in Court, it is not a judgment and it can be changed or altered at any time before it is signed and sealed. Another Division Bench of this Court, consisting of Jagdish Sahai and G.C. Mathur JJ, doubted the correctness of the view taken in Faulad's case, 1961 All LJ 244 : (AIR 1961 All 326), and for this reason the latter Bench has referred the following question for decision by a Full Bench :-

"Whether, after a judgment has been orally dictated in open Court but before it is signed and sealed, it can be completely changed ?"

This Full Bench has been constituted for the purposes of answering the question mentioned above.

2. The answer to the question depends upon the interpretation of Chapter VII rules 1 to 4 of this Court. In Faulad's case. 1961 All LJ 244 : (AIR 1961 All 326) (supra), V.G. Oak and Kailash Prasad JJ. considered the language of Chapter VII rules 1 to 4 and relied upon a number of authorities mentioned in their judgment in support of the conclusion at which they arrived. This question was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 194. Their Lordships referring to rules 1 to 4 of Chapter VII said this :-

"These rules provide for four different situations : (1) for judgments which are pronounced at once as soon as the case has been heard; (E) for those which are pronounced on some future date; (3) for judgments which are oral, and (4) for those which are written. These rules use the word "pronounced" in some places and "delivered" in others. Counsel tried to make capital out of this and said that a judgment had to be both "pronounced" and "delivered" and that they were two different things.

We do not intend to construe these rules too technically because they are designed, as indeed are all rules, to further the ends of justice and must not be viewed too narrowly; nor do we desire to curtail the jurisdiction which the Privy Council point out is inherent in Courts to make good inherent defects caused by accidents such as death."

A perusal of this decision of the Supreme Court shows that their Lordships considered three different contingencies : (1) a case in which arguments have been beard and judgment has been reserved and is pronounced at a later date; (2) a case in which judgment is delivered in open Court after arguments have been heard but it has not been signed; and (3) a case in which judgment has not only been delivered after hearing arguments but has also been transcribed and signed. As regards the first of the three contingencies mentioned above their Lordships observed as follows :-

"Now, upto the moment the judgment is delivered judges have the right to change their mind. There is a sort of "locus paenitentiae" and indeed, last minute alterations often do occur. Therefore, however much a draft judgment may have been signed beforehand; it is nothing but a draft till formally delivered as the judgment of the Court. Only then does it crystallise into a full fledged judgment and become operative."

With regard to the second and the third contingencies mentioned above, their Lordships observed as follows :-

"After the judgment has been delivered provision is made for review. One provision is that it can be freely altered or amended or even changed completely without further formality, except notice to the parties and a rehearing on the point of change should that be necessary, provided it has not been signed. Another is that after signature a review properly so-called would lie in civil cases but none in criminal; but the review, when it lies, is only permitted on very narrow grounds. But in this case the mere fact that a Judge is dead and so cannot review his judgment does not affect the validity of the judgment which