JUDGMENT :- This is a tenant's second appeal from the decree of the Additional Civil judge, Muzaffarnagar confirming that of the Additional Munsif, Muzaffarnagar issuing a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant Behari Lal from installing an electric flour mill in the house let out to him and to remove it if he had already installed it.

The plaintiff-respondent Smt. Chandrawati is the landlord of the house which was let out to Behari Lal several years ago. It is common ground that the accommodation is a residential house and was let out to Beharilal several years ago. It is common ground that the accommodation is a residential house and was let out to Behari Lal for residing in it. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had recently installed, or was about to install, in the house a flour mill driven by electricity and had dug the foundations for this purpose. She asked for an injunction to restrain the defendant from installing the mill, and in the alternative, for a mandatory injunction asking him to remove it.

2. The defendant resisted the suit. His main defence was that by installing the mill he had not gone outside the purpose for which the accommodation had been let out to him. He admitted that he had obtained the house for residing in it, but alleged that for several years he had been carrying on the business of selling sweets and running a laundry in the house and the plaintiff had raised no objection. He, therefore, contended that the original purpose must be deemed to have been enlarged with the consent of the landlord to include trade. He further contended that the trade included manufacturing, or at any rate, grinding flour for the purposes of selling.

3. Both the courts below held that the tenancy originally was for a residential purpose, but for several years the defendants had been carrying on the business mentioned above, but this business did not include manufacturing or installing or running a flour mill. The defendants had been asked not to install the flour mill, and to remove it if it had been installed already. He has now come to this Court second appeal.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the view of that lower appellate court that the trading does not include manufacturing or, at any rate, running a flour mill is erroneous. He contended that the word trade or business is wide enough to include manufacturing I cannot agree. Trading is the exchange or sale of goods, whereas manufacture is the making of goods by a technical or industrial process. Running a flour mill is

substantially a process of manufacture, as the mill grinds corn into flout and thereby makes a new product.

Therefore trading does not include running a flour mill. Moreover, the vibrations of the engine of a flour mill are likely to damage a residential house.

5. Moreover, the appellant is not entitled to argue that his tenancy was for the general purpose of carrying on a trade. It is common ground that the original purpose of the tenancy was residential. But the appellant relies on the fact that he started the business of selling sweets and running a laundry without any objection from the landlord. In fact he was raising the plea of acquiescence which is a kind of estoppel.

The appellant's case really is that the landlord having permitted him to do certain acts for several years cannot object at this stage. But even if this plea succeeds it is limited to the precise acts which the appellant has been committing in the house without any objection from the landlord. In other words, he may be permitted to carry on the business of selling sweets or running a laundry, but no further.

6. Learned counsel then argued that the landlord's remedy was a suit for ejectment and not injunction. I cannot agree. The rights and liabilities of a tenant arose from the contract of tenancy and certain provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. If the lessee commits any act in violation of his obligations, the landlord is entitled to seek the hel

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