Allahbad High Court
D.S.MATHUR
Tripathi Sansnath - Appellant
Versus
Tripathi Bhagwat Nath - Respondent
Decided On : 08/11/1964
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - ORDER XVII RULE 3 - INTERPRETATION - DIRECTORY AND NOT MANDATORY - DELAY IN PRONOUNCING JUDGMENT - EFFECT.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiffs filed a suit for the recovery of possession of certain plots. The trial court, after rejecting the plaintiffs' application for adjournment, proceeded with the suit under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. The defendant's evidence was recorded on the same day, but the judgment was pronounced after about three weeks. The plaintiffs appealed to the District Judge, who set aside the decree and remanded the suit for a fresh hearing, holding that the delay in pronouncing the judgment was illegal.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the provisions of Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. are directory and not mandatory. The Court has the power to proceed to decide the suit forthwith and not adjourn the hearing by granting the defaulting party an additional opportunity to produce evidence or perform any other act necessary for the further progress of the suit. However, where the Court decides not to grant an additional opportunity to the defaulting party, it proceeds under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C., and ordinarily, the evidence of the other party must be recorded that day. Judgment should ordinarily be pronounced on the date the Court proceeded with the suit under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C., or the evidence of the party was recorded. But where it is not possible to pronounce judgment immediately after the close of the evidence, it can be pronounced within a reasonable period. This rule is for the guidance of the Court, and the defaulting party cannot derive any benefit from any omission on the part of the Court not to record evidence and not to pronounce judgment on the date it was decided to proceed under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. Further, any action taken by the Court shall not be invalid on the ground that evidence was not recorded or judgment was not pronounced on the same date.
Issues: 1. Whether Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. permits the Court to decide the suit within a reasonable period? 2. Whether Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. is mandatory in the sense that for the disregard thereof the decree becomes illegal and without jurisdiction?
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the provisions of Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. are directory and not mandatory. The Court has the power to proceed to decide the suit forthwith and not adjourn the hearing by granting the defaulting party an additional opportunity to produce evidence or perform any other act necessary for the further progress of the suit. However, where the Court decides not to grant an additional opportunity to the defaulting party, it proceeds under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C., and ordinarily, the evidence of the other party must be recorded that day. Judgment should ordinarily be pronounced on the date the Court proceeded with the suit under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C., or the evidence of the party was recorded. But where it is not possible to pronounce judgment immediately after the close of the evidence, it can be pronounced within a reasonable period. This rule is for the guidance of the Court, and the defaulting party cannot derive any benefit from any omission on the part of the Court not to record evidence and not to pronounce judgment on the date it was decided to proceed under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. Further, any action taken by the Court shall not be invalid on the ground that evidence was not recorded or judgment was not pronounced on the same date.
Final Decision: The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the District Judge, and remanded the appeal to the trial court for hearing on merits.
JUDGMENT : This is an appeal by Tripathi Sansnath, defendant against the order of the Additional Civil Judge of Basti allowing the appeal of Tripalhi Bhagwat Nath (now represented by his legal representatives) and other, plaintiffs, whereby the decree and judgment of the Additional Munsif in suit No. 1124 of 1954 was set aside and the suit was remanded for a fresh hearing in accordance with the law.
2. The present suit was for the recovery of possession over plots detailed at the foot of the plaint. Issues were framed on 19-4-1955 and 26-5-1955 was fixed for final hearing. Hearing was adjourned on many dates, sometimes on the request of the plaintiffs, and at others, of the defendant The last adjournment was sought for by the plaintiffs. On the grounds that their witnesses were not present 20-4-1956 was then fixed for final hearing but on that date also the plaintiffs applied for adjournment on the same ground. The application for adjournment was rejected and the Munsif proceeded with the suit under Order XVII,. Rule 3, C.P.C. After the rejection of the adjournment application the counsel for the plaintiffs made a statement that he had no instructions. No evidence was thus adduced by the plaintiffs and after recording the evidence of the defendant the Munsif fixed 14-5-1956 for the pronouncement of judgment. Judgment was pronounced that day (14-5-1956).
3. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the District Judge against the decree of the Additional Munsif dismissing their suit with costs under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. The appeal was heard by the Additional Civil Judge who relying upon the case of Dayalji Wasanji v. Kedarnath Onkarmal and Co.. AIR 1953 Nag 222 allowed the appeal on the ground that it was necessary for the Munsif to pronounce judgment on the date the trial was ordered to proceed under Order XVII. Rule 3, C.P.C. As the judgment was pronounced after more than three weeks a gross illegality was committed and the decree being illegal deserved to be set aside.
4. Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. as amended by the Allahabad High Court runs as below
"Where any party to a suit to whom lime has been granted fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which lime has been allowed, the Court may, notwithstanding such default, proceed to decide the suit forthwith." The rule lays down that instead of adjourning the hearing of the suit the Court can proceed to decide it forthwith. The learned Civil Judge was apparently of the opinion that the word forthwith' has the same meaning as "at once" and that it was necessary for the Munsif to record evidence of the defendant and also to pronounce judgment on the date he decided to proceed under Order XVII Rule 3. C. P. C.
5. Two questions for consideration are :-
(1) Whether Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. permits the Court to decide the suit within a reasonable period :-
(2) Whether Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. is mandatory in the sense that for the disregard thereof the decree becomes illegal and without jurisdiction ?
The term "forthwith" has been defined in Wharton's Law Lexicon 14th Ed. as below :-
"When a defendant is ordered to plead forthwith, he must plead within 24 hours. When a statute or rule of Court or requires an act to be done 'forthwith' it means that the act is to be done within a reasonable time having regard to the object of the provision and the circumstances of the case."
Similarly, in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Ed the meaning of the expression "forthwith" has been given, at page 341 as below :-
"When a statute requires that something shall be done ''forthwith" or "immediately" or even "instantly" it would probably be understood as following a reasonable time for doing it. An application to deprive a plaintiff of costs which must be made 'at the trial' was deemed made in time when made an hour after the trial was over and the judge was frying ano
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