HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Srinath Sahay
ABDUL WAHID
Versus
ANISA BEGUM
Decided On : 23 November 1990
Criminal Revision No. 1734 of 1989
MUSLIM WOMEN (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS ON DIVORCE) ACT, 1986 - SECTION 2(C), 3 - RESIDENCE - INTERPRETATION - JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATE.
Fact of the Case:
A Muslim woman, Smt. Anisa Begum, filed an application under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, seeking maintenance and other reliefs from her ex-husband, Abdul Wahid. The application was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction as Smt. Anisa Begum resided in Kanpur at the time of filing the application. The Additional Sessions Judge, on revision, set aside the trial court's order and directed Abdul Wahid to pay a certain sum of money to Smt. Anisa Begum.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the Additional Sessions Judge erred in interfering with the finding of the trial court that Smt. Anisa Begum resided in Kanpur at the time of filing the application. The court held that the word "resides" in Section 2(c) of the Act means the place where the divorced woman through her choice makes it her abode permanently or temporarily, but not a place where she pays a flying visit or has a casual stay. The court found that there was no clear and positive finding that Smt. Anisa Begum possessed the animus manendi to live at Mianganj and had made it her abode or residence.
Issues: 1. Whether the Additional Sessions Judge erred in interfering with the finding of the trial court that Smt. Anisa Begum resided in Kanpur at the time of filing the application? 2. Whether the Additional Sessions Judge should have remanded the case for trial instead of deciding the case on merits himself?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the Additional Sessions Judge erred in interfering with the finding of the trial court that Smt. Anisa Begum resided in Kanpur at the time of filing the application. The court held that the word "resides" in Section 2(c) of the Act means the place where the divorced woman through her choice makes it her abode permanently or temporarily, but not a place where she pays a flying visit or has a casual stay. The court found that there was no clear and positive finding that Smt. Anisa Begum possessed the animus manendi to live at Mianganj and had made it her abode or residence. 2. The court held that the Additional Sessions Judge should have remanded the case for trial instead of deciding the case on merits himself. However, this point did not arise in view of the conclusion regarding jurisdiction as indicated above.
Final Decision: The High Court allowed the revision application, set aside the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, and restored the order of the trial court.
This is a revision against the order dated 1. 12. 89 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Farrukhabad, allowing the application of Smt. Anisa Begum, opposite party No. 1, under Section 3
of the Muslim Women (Protec tion of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 and directing Abdul Wahid, revisionist, to pay a certain sum of money, specified in the order, to her.
2. The revisionist and opposite party No. 1 are Muslims, who were married in 1982. A divorce took place between them on 15th July, 1986 and thereafter on 20th December in the same year the aforesaid application was made by opposite party No. 1 for recovery of a sum of Rs. 19,600. 00 from the revisionist. The application was filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Kannauj in District Farrukhabad. The application was dismissed by the learned Magistrate by order dated 10th August, 1988 on the ground that the op posite party No. 1 resided at Kanpur at the time of filing the application and, therefore, the court has no jurisdiction. The opposite party No. 1 filed revision which was disposed of by the learned Additional Sessions Judge as aforesaid. He took the view that at the time of filing the application, the opposite party No. 1 resided with her grand parents in Minva Ganj Kannauj and, therefore, the learned Magistrate had jurisdiction to decide the case. The learned Additional Sessions Judge also proceeded to consider the case on merits and accordingly directed the revisionist to pay to the opposite party No. 1 a sum of Rs. 10,000. 00 as price of certain goods, Rs. 5,000. 00 as Mehr, Rs. 3,000. 00 per month as maintenance during the period ohddat and Rs. 1,000. 00 as maintenance of the Children for a period of one year six months and Rs. 200. 00 as expenses; thus, a sum of Rs. 19,600. 00 in all.
3. The learned counsel for the revisionist has assailed the order under revision on two grounds. In the first place he has urged that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has erred in law in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the trial court that the opposite party No. 1 used to live in Kanpur at the time of filing the application under Section 3 of the aforesaid Act. He has submitted that even if two views were possible on the basis of evidence, it was not open to the learned Additional Sessions Judge to inter fere with the finding of the trial court and to come to a different conclusion. Secondly, it has been submitted by the learned counsel that after coming to the conclusion that the trial court has jurisdiction, a fact which is disputed by the revisionist, the learned Additional Sessions Judge should have remanded the case for determination on merits and should not have proceeded to dispose of the case himself.
4. The first contention, put forward on behalf of the revisionist may be taken up. Section 2 (c) of the aforesaid Act provides that in this Act unless the context otherwise requires, "magistrate" means a Magistrate of 1st class, exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 in the area where the divorced woman resides. Section 3 (2) of the Act lays down that where a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance of the amount of Mahr or Dower due has not been made or paid or the properties have not been delivered or the properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) of this Section have not been delivered to a divorced woman on her divorce, she or any one duly authorised by her may, on her behalf, make an application to a Magistrate for an order for payment of such provision
and maintenance, Mahr or dower or the delivery of properties, as the case may be. A combined reading of the aforesaid provisions will show that the application is to be made to a Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under the Cr. P. C. in the area where the divorced woman resides. The word reside has not been defined in the Act and, therefore, it is to be understood in its ordinary legal sense. In Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Sin
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