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1989 Supreme(All) 116

HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
R.S.Dhavan, R.R.Misra
CHANDRA PAL
Versus
KESHAV DEO
Decided On : 17 February 1989
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7166 of 1988

Advocates Appeared:
Tej Pal,

Polygamy is not a fundamental right of Muslims under Islamic law and that the Koran permits polygamy only as an exception and not as a rule.

Headnote:

HINDU MARRIAGE ACT - SECTION 17 - ULTRA VIRES - BIGAMY - MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW - POLYGAMY - INTERPRETATION OF KORAN - ARTICLE 21 - RIGHT TO LIFE AND LIBERTY - ARTICLE 25 - FREEDOM OF RELIGION.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, a Hindu, challenged the constitutionality of Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which prohibit bigamy, arguing that they violate his right to life and liberty under Article 21 and his freedom of religion under Article 25 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner claimed that he should be allowed to practice polygamy, like Muslims, who are permitted to have up to four wives under Islamic law.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the petitioner's challenge was without merit and dismissed the petition. The court found that polygamy is not a fundamental right of Muslims under Islamic law and that the Koran, the holy book of Islam, permits polygamy only as an exception and not as a rule. The court also found that the petitioner's understanding of polygamy under Islam was flawed and that he had misrepresented and ill-judged the concept.

Issues: 1. Whether Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, are ultra vires the Constitution of India? 2. Whether polygamy is a fundamental right of Muslims under Islamic law? 3. Whether the petitioner's understanding of polygamy under Islam is correct?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, are not ultra vires the Constitution of India. The court found that these provisions do not violate the petitioner's right to life and liberty under Article 21 or his freedom of religion under Article 25. 2. The court held that polygamy is not a fundamental right of Muslims under Islamic law. The court found that the Koran permits polygamy only as an exception and not as a rule. The court also found that the petitioner's understanding of polygamy under Islam was flawed and that he had misrepresented and ill-judged the concept.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's challenge was without merit.

RAVI S. DIAWON, J.

Misunderstanding another mans religion can lead to disastrous results. Religious are not meant to be played around with for personal gain. Such is case in the present writ petition before this Court.

2. The petitioner, Chandrapal, is a Hindu. His father-in-law instituted a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mathura that the petitioner be prosecuted under Sections 494 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code.

3. The complaint against the petitioner was that he was a bigamous spouse. Thus, proceedings for prosecution of the petitioner were set in motion in Criminal Case No. 2990 of 1987: Keshav Dev. Chandrapal. Keshav Dev is the father-in-law. Chandrapal is the petitioner facing prosecution on the charge of bigamy.

4. The Chief Judicial Magistrate summoned the petitioner and his lather as an accomplice. The petitioner and his father have run to this Court by a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The contention of the petitioner before this Court is, in effect, that Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act - 1955 is ultra vires, of the equality clause under the Constitution of India and his prosecution under Section 494 of the Code offends his life and liberty under Article 21. The petitioner contends that a restraint upon a Hindu to have only one wife should be set at naught and for this purpose draws and analogy that if he were a Muslim he would get away with it and cannot be

prosecuted under Section 494 of the Code. Consequently, the contents that even Section 494 of the Penal Code is ultra vires.

5. The petitioner has also made some insidious expressions in the writ petition, which are otherwise vexatious, whatever they may be worth. The submissions are in paragraph 13 of the writ petition to the effect that after a lapse of 41 years the Muslims have increased their population and they have enjoined more privileges. This Court cannot permit such expressions of irresponsibility to remain on record. Even otherwise they have no bearing or relevance with the case and are being deleted from the record.

6. The grievance of the petitioner is contained in paragraph 11 of the writ petition. It reads : -

"that by virtue of Section 17 (sic) Hindu Marriage Act/hindus are denied to marry more than once at the pain (sic) of punishment under Section 494 I. P. C. " Then the petitioner contends in paragraph 12: -

"that uniform service rules have been framed by the States as well by Center (sic) wherein bigamy is prohibited to both the sects. It is strange that now Section 494 I. P. C. is applicable only to Hindus. "

7. There needs to be a limit to expressions of male chauvinism. The impression which the court gets is that given a chance the petitioner would like to have another wife. Further, merely because a son may not be born, the petitioner considers it his right to procreate through another woman and insists that it is legitimate. Throughout the arguments the contention on behalf of the petitioner was that under the Constitution the petitioner cannot be denied a right to bigamy, a right which, otherwise, every Muslim has. All these places are being made because the petitioner faces prosecution on a complaint by his father-in-law that he has married second time.

8. The petitioner justifies his second marriage by ignoring the morality of the Hindu religion, but is quick to grab the understanding he has of the Muslim religion. Here lies the misunderstanding of another religion. The Petitioner was asked by the Court that the before anything can be examined he must indicate to the court on what his understanding on polygamy under Islam is only a lay man may say that a Muslim has a right to have four wives there is more to this aspect.

9. What this court has to examine is, notwithstanding that there is no codi fication by legislation of marriages amongst Muslims, whether polygamy is encour aged or is permitted as an exception and not

as a rule. The Court brought to the notice of the petitioners cou
























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