HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
S.K.Phaujdar
BHARAT SINGH
Versus
DHARAM PAL SINGH
Decided On : 10 May 1996
Second Appeal No, 282 of 1977
EASEMENT - PUBLIC PATHWAY - BHUMIDHARI LAND - RIGHT OF EASEMENT - SECTION 30 OF THE EASEMENTS ACT, 1882 - INTERPRETATION - PARTITION OF DOMINANT HERITAGE - EFFECT ON EASEMENT - CIVIL SUIT FOR DECLARATION OF PUBLIC PATHWAY ON BHUMIDHARI LAND - MAINTAINABILITY - SECTION 49 OF THE U. P. CONSOLIDATION OF HOLDINGS ACT, 1960 - APPLICABILITY.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff claimed a right of easement on a pathway lying towards the west of his haveli, alleging that he and his predecessors had been using the pathway for 100 years and that the defendants intended to block the pathway by raising constructions. The defendants contested the suit, claiming that the pathway was on their bhumidhari land and that the plaintiff had no right to use it.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that a right of easement cannot be claimed on a public pathway, as there is no dominant heritage as against the public pathway. However, the court also held that a right of easement can be claimed on a bhumidhari land, but that in the present case, the plaintiff's claim was in violation of Section 30 of the Easements Act, 1882, as the plaintiff could not claim a second passage through the land of the defendants to the public pathway merely on the ground of partition of the dominant heritage.
Issues: 1. Whether a right of easement can be claimed on a public pathway? 2. Whether a right of pathway can exist on a land which has been declared to be a bhumidhari land? 3. Whether a right of easement can be claimed on a bhumidhari land?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. A right of easement cannot be claimed on a public pathway, as there is no dominant heritage as against the public pathway. 2. A right of easement can be claimed on a bhumidhari land, but the claim must not violate the provisions of Section 30 of the Easements Act, 1882, which provides that where a dominant heritage is divided between two or more persons, the easement becomes annexed to each on the shares, but not so as to increase substantially the burden on the servant heritage. 3. A civil suit for a declaration that a pathway on a bhumidhari land is a public pathway is barred under Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1960, as the consolidation proceeding has finally settled the dispute regarding the nature and possession of the land.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, the judgment and decree of the first appellate court was set aside, and the judgment and decree of the court of first instance dismissing the suit was restored.
The present second appeal was admitted on the follow ing substantial questions of law:
(1) whether the right of easement can be claimed on a public path way;
(2) whether the right of path way can exist on a land which has been declared to be a bhumidhari land of the appellant; and
(3) whether the right of easement can be claimed on a bhumidhari land.
2. A suit was filed before the Munsif, Bijnor, by the present respondent which was registered as Original Suit No. 237 of 1972. The present appellants were the defendants therein. The suit related to a path- way lying towards the west of the haveli belonging to the plaintiff. The pathy-way stretched from north to south and was a public way. The plaintiff and his predecessor have been in use of that path-way for 100 years and the pathy-way was capable of use by foot and by bullock-cart. The plaintiff claimed to have acquired in easementary right thereon. There was no other way for such user by the plaintiff for egress and ingress from and to his Haveli and Ahata. It was alleged that the defendants intended to block the path by raising some constructions although they had no right thereon. The defendants had also started keeping their manure pits in the path-ways to the hindrance of the plaintiff in its user. The plaintiff prayed for a per manent injunction against the defendants so that no disturbance or hindrance to the use of the path-way be created by them.
3. The defendants contested the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs family owned a residential building in the southern por tion of the abadi in question. In the plaint, the southern boundary of the Haveli of the plaintiff was indicated as Ahata of Phool Singh. The Ahata of the plaintiff and Ahata of Phool Singh was one and the same. Mohan Singh was the grand- ancestor of the plaintiffs family. His sons had a grove on plot No. 1384 prior to 1934. Mokha, a son of this Mohan Singh, had raised in Ahata in the south-western portion of the abovesaid grove in 1935 and had opened a 10 ft. wide door in the western wall of the Ahata. In 1937, the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants had filed a suit against Mokha which ended in a compromise and Mokha and others were permitted to keep the aforesaid door opened for their egress and ingress from and to their Ahata and in lieu of this concession, they made some payment to the two ancestors-in-interest of the defendants. That door was still in existence, according to the defendants. To the west of the door there was still a 10 ft. wide land to be used as an approach road for reaching the public path-way in plot No. 1201, now num bered as plot No. 1032 in consolidation proceedings. This 10 ft. wide land was in the use of Mokha and his successors as their path. In 1972, one Bhim Singh, a grand-uncle of the plaintiff became the Pradhan of the village. Taking advantage of the tem porary absence of the defendants from the village, the plaintiff and other members of his family, with the connivance of the Prad han, Bhim Singh, demolished a portion of the western wall of their Ahata in its north ern portion and further demolished a cattle trough of the defendants which was in exist ence since long. These persons further raised a wall towards the east of their Kotha and the plaintiff and others started asserting a right to use the northern portion of their western wall of the ahata so demolished as a door. The defendants asserted that the plaintiff and others had no right to use any door other than the one which was in exist ence from before and which, in terms of the compromise in the suit of 1937, they were permitted to use. The plaintiff and others had also opened sky light in the western wall of their kotha and had opened two parnalas on their kotha towards their west which was originally lying towards north. The defen dants submitted that the land lying towards the west of the ahata cf the plaintiff was plot No. 1200/2, now designated as plot No. 944 in the consolida
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