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1997 Supreme(All) 1140

HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
D.K.Seth
BANKEY SINGH
Versus
STATE OF U P
Decided On : 23 September 1997
C. M. W. P. No. 1494 of 1986

Advocates Appeared:
A.PRAKASH, S.N.SRIVASTAVA,

The appellate authority does not have jurisdiction to decide the question of withholding an appeal when the forwarding authority has not withheld the appeal under Rule 64(3) of the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1930.

Headnote:

WITHHOLDING OF APPEAL - CIVIL SERVICE (CLASSIFICATION, CONTROL AND APPEALS) RULES, 1930 - RULE 64(3) - APPELLATE AUTHORITY'S JURISDICTION - INTERPRETATION OF RULES 64, 65, 66, 67, 68 AND 69.

Fact of the Case:

Petitioner, a government employee, was dismissed from service for absconding without sanction of leave or authority. He allegedly filed an appeal beyond the six-month limitation period, which was forwarded to the appellate authority despite the delay. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal as time-barred. The petitioner challenged this decision in a claim petition before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, which affirmed the appellate authority's order.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that once an appeal is forwarded to the appellate authority without being withheld, the appellate authority is not required to consider whether the appeal should have been withheld. The court found that the appellate authority had erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation, as the forwarding authority had not withheld the appeal under Rule 64(3) of the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1930.

Issues: 1. Whether the appellate authority has jurisdiction to decide the question of withholding an appeal when the forwarding authority has not withheld the appeal under Rule 64(3) of the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1930? 2. Whether the six-month limitation period for filing an appeal is mandatory?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted Rules 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, and 69 of the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1930, and found that the appellate authority's jurisdiction is limited to deciding appeals that have been forwarded to it by the forwarding authority. The court held that the forwarding authority's decision not to withhold an appeal is final and cannot be reviewed by the appellate authority. 2. The court found that the six-month limitation period for filing an appeal is not mandatory, as Rule 67(2) empowers the forwarding authority to submit a quarterly report of withheld cases to the appellate authority, and Rule 68 empowers the appellate authority to call for any appeal admissible under the rules that has been withheld by a subordinate authority.

Final Decision: The court quashed the appellate authority's order dismissing the appeal and directed the appellate authority to decide the appeal on merit in accordance with law.

D. K. SETH, J.

Shri S. N. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the petitioner ad dressed a very interesting question which might he formulated as follows:-

"according to him appeal provided under Rule 56 can be withheld under Rule 64, if it is not preferred within six months but 11 it is not withheld and is forwarded to the appellate authority, despite the appeal having preferred beyond six months it is not open to the appellate authority to dismiss the appeal on the ground of its being preferred beyond six months. "

2. Learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, contends that there cannot he an indefinite period for preferring an ap peal. It has to be preferred within a reasonable period which has been prescribed as six months. Unless sufficient cause has been shown for which the appeal could not be filed within six months, it is always open to the appellate authority to dismiss the same even it is not withheld but the question of not withholding of the appeal does not take away of the jurisdic tion of the appellate authority for deciding all the points that might be raised.

3. In order to understand the respec tive contentions, it is necessary to look into the facts of this case in brief which are admitted. The petitioner having been dis missed by an order dated 9-2-1978 on the

ground that he was absconding without any sanction of leave or authority over a long period of time, alleged to have preferred an appeal dated 29-2-1978 sent under certificate of posting. The said ap peal was received on 3-10-1980 in the Department. In 1978 the month of February consisted of 28 days. The certifi cate of posting was disbelieved by the ap pellate authority and held that ththe appeal alleged to have been preferred on 3-10-1980. Therefore, it was dismissed on the ground of its being presented beyond six months. The order of the appellate authority "as on 31-1-1985 being An nexure-7 to the writ petition. The said order when challenged in claim petition No. 200/ (F)/iii/1985 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition), the U. P. Public Services Tribunal No. Ill, Luck-iow vide its judg ment and order dated 29-10- 1985 had af firmed the order of the appellate authority and dismissed the claim petition as time barred.

4. In support of his contention, Mr. Srivastava, relied on the order dated 29-7-1982, being Annexure-6 to the writ peti tion, by which the petitioners appeal was sought to be forwarded to the appellate authority. Learned Standing Counsel points out from the said order that it had dealt with a representation and not an appeal, therefore, it cannot be said that the appeal was forwarded as contended by Mr. Srivastava. The said contention of Mr. Parihar, learned Standing Counsel has been explained by Mr. Srivastava relying on the proviso to Rule 56 of the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Ap peals) Rules, 1930 as applicable in U. P. (hereinafter called as the Rules ). Accord ing to him, Rule 56 postulates appeal only against three punishments prescribed therein inflicted under Rule 49 and no appeal lies against punishments other than specified in Rule 56. Therefore, the punishment being one of said three categories provided in Rule 56, no repre sentation lies and it is only an appeal that lies. In the order contained in Annexure-6, the appeal has been referred to as repre sentation. The said contention of Mr. Srivastava stands supported by reason of order contained in Annexure-7 which refers to the same as an appeal and it is not contended either by the learned Standing Counsel nor it does appear from An- nexure-7 that any other representation other than the appeal has ever been preferred by the petitioner.

5. Rule 56 provides as follows:-

"56. (1) Every person included in one of classes (1) to (5) specified in Rule 14, shall he entitled to appeal, as hereinafter provided, from an order passed by a competent authority:-

(a) imposing upon him any of the follow ing penalties specified in Rule 49:

(i) Reduction to lower post or time-scale, to a l


















































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