K. B. SRIVASTAVA, J.

( 1 ) THIS application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, arises out of the following facts;-

The respondent Babadin instituted proceedings under Section 145 of the Code against the five petitioners in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Manjhanpur, District Allahabad. The learned Magistrate, passed the preliminary order on February 11, 1974, The petitioners filed their written statement on May 24, 1974, in paragraph 1 of which, they raised the plea that no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists or has existed, and they supported this plea of theirs in various affidavits. The learned Magistrate passed no orders on this plea of theirs and instead proceeded to issue the final order declaring Babadin to be entitled to possession until evicted in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such, possession until such eviction. The petitioner feeling aggrieved, went up in revision to the Sessions Judge, Allahabad and contended that the order passed by the learned Magistrate stood vitiated because of the failure on his part to decide the jurisdictional question which had been raised by them before him. The learned Sessions Judge, however, dismissed the revision by the remark that there was an observation in the judgment of the Magistrate that a dispute between parties existed regarding land and that observation was sufficient to indicate that apprehension of breach of peace existed This remark of the learned Sessions Judge, however, is not borne out from the record. The learned Magistrate has certainly narrated the facts and in that connection has stated the respective cases of the parties but nowhere has he given a decision in so far as the jurisdictional question was concerned. It is no longer open to controversy that the failure to decide such a question, makes the final order coram non judice. If any authority is needed on the point, I may cite the Full Bench decision of this Court in Gajraj v. Collector Singh 1975 All LJ 99 : 1975 Cri LJ 1026 (FB ). In view of that pronouncement of the law, I have no manner of doubt in my mind that the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate is a nullity which, requires to be quashed.

( 2 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners has taken his stand on Sections 482 and 483 of the Code and has argued that the impugned order can be quashed under both or either of these two sections. The argument based on Section 483 is, however, wholly misconceived. That section says that every High Court shall so exercise its superintendence over the Courts of Judicial Magistrates subordinate to it as to ensure that there is an expeditious and proper disposal of cases by such Magistrate. There is no question of expeditious disposal of any pending matter, as the case already stands decided. With regard to the exercise of superintendence for the proper disposal of cases, proceeding on the assumption that the supervisory power is both judicial and administrative, it is apparent that it can be exercised only over Judicial Magistrate and not Executive Magistrates. Under Section 6 of the Code, Executive Magistrates constitute a class of criminal Courts different from the class of criminal Courts manned by the Judicial Magistrates. Sections 11 to 15 deal with Judicial Magistrates, while Executive Magistrates have been dealt with by Sections 20 to 23. Proceedings under Section 145 lie within the jurisdiction of Executive Magistrates and not judicial Magistrates. The impugned order was passed by an Executive Magistrate and there is thus no supervisory power to correct a mistake committed by such a Magistrate. The claim of the petitioners has, therefore, to be tested under Section 482.

( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for Babadin has vehemently argued that the revisional order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is final and sacrosanct and cannot be touched by this Court even under Section 482. He invited my attention in this regard to Sub-sectio

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