The opposite party no. 1 filed a complaint against the peti tioner and 11 others on 23rd July, 1976 to the effect that on 23rd January, 1976, at about 12 noon, he had been surroun ded by the accused persons who had threa tened to teach him a lesson and beaten him with kicks and fists and his compa nion Maqsood with knife/knives and Dandas. It was also stated that he had sent a report about the occurrence through post to the District Superintendent of Police and as no action had been ta ken on that report, the complaint was being filed. The complainant was exa mined by the Magistrate on 13th August, 1976. In that statement on oath he did not make any mention of the report alle gedly sent to the Superintendent of Police.

It further appears that only the com plainant was medically examined on 23rd 1975, at 6. 30 p. m. and one contusion 1/6 cm. x 11/2 cm. on the right side of chest was found. It was a simple injury apparently caused by some blunt object.

The Magistrate has summoned the accused persons and has refused to dis charge them. Aggrieved thereby, the revi sionist has come to this court under sec tion 482 of the Code of Criminal Proce dure, 1973, praying that the proceedings in the trial court may be quashed.

Although the complaint was filed under sections 323, 324, 147 and 148, it appears that there was no medical evi dence in support of any injury caused by any knife as alleged in the complaint. There was no explanation whatsoever for the long delay in filing the complaint. The law prescribes one years limitation for filing a complaint under section 323. Even the lodging of the first informa tion report was not established. It, is accordingly, contended by learned coun sel for the applicant that the allegations relative to sections 324, 147 and 148 I. P. C. have been made only by way of exaggeration so as to take the case out of the bar of limitation.

Learned counsel for the opposite-party no. 1, has, on the other hand, contended that it is not open to this Court at this stage to believe or disbelieve the evidence and that if the complaint, assumed to be

true, makes out in the eye of law a case under these sections, there would be no occasion for interference under section 482 Cr. P. C.

In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (A. I. R. 1960 Supreme Court 866.) it was observed by their Lorpships as follows :

"it is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for qua shing the proceedings (Emphasis sup plied ).

Out of the categories enumerated, the third category mentions cases in which there is no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

From this it cannot, however, be as sumed that the categories mentioned in Kapurs case were exhaustive. As would appear from the extract quoted above, their Lordships clearly meant the enu meration of categories to be illustrative. Moreover, it was also observed at the end that they were dealing with a case on Special Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution against a decision of the High Court which had refused to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in favour of the appellant. Whether or not they would have come to the same conclusion if they were dealing with the same matter themselves under section 561-A, was, according to their Lordships, not really very material. Non-the-less, they did examine the evidence and held that it was not a case where the appli cant-appellant could justly contend that on the face of the record the charge level led against him was unsustainable.

In a recent decision reported in State of Karnataka v. Muniswamy (1977) 2 Supreme Court cases 699.) it has been held that the three instances cited in the judgment in Kapurs case were only illustrative. Their Lordships added that considerat