An order of attachment passed under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. is a final order and it will continue to be operative so long as the parties do not approach the proper forum for vindication of their rights.

( 1 ) THIS revision application arises out of the proceedings under S 145 Cr. P. C. An application under Section 145 Cr. P. C. was filed by Ram Lubhaya and others on 12th June 1978. The Station Officer Kotwali was directed to make a spot inspection and to submit his report. The Station Officer reported vide Annexure c dated 12-6-1978 that there was an apprehension of breach of peace and prayed for attachment of the disputed property. Another detailed report was called for by the Magistrate on 13-6-1978 which was submitted the same day vide Annexure d in which while recommending action under Section 145 Cr. P. C. it was also reported that civil litigation had been decided with respect to the same property by the Munsif as well as by the Civil and Sessions Judge in favour of Smt. Prem Lata. It appears that the Magistrate asked for the opinion of the District Government Council (Criminal ). He was of the opinion that it was not desirable to initiate proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. in view of the Civil litigation between the parties, and if there was apprehension of the breach of peace, then the party concerned should be proceeded with under Section 107/117 Cr. P. C. Thereafter on 15th June 1978 Ram Lobhaya and three others again filed an application under Sections 145/147 Cr. P. C. on which the Station Officer Kotwali was again directed to submit his report. The Station Officer Kotwali reported on 15-6-1978 that there was an apprehension of the breach of peace and that the property in dispute may be attached under Section 146 Cr P. C. On 16th June 1978 the City Magistrate, Mathura being of the opinion that there was an apprehension of the breach of peace and considering the case one of emergency, passed impugned order attaching the property in dispute. Hence this revision.

( 2 ) I have heard counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also perused the documents on the record. A preliminary objection has been taken that the impugned order being an interlocutory order the revision in question is not maintainable. Learned Counsel for the applicants has argued that the impugned order is not an interlocutory order. His submission is that if this Court comes to the conclusion that since the civil dispute with respect to the land in question has been decided in favour of the applicants, the court below should not have proceeded under Section 145 Cr. P. C. but should have taken action under Section 107/117 Cr. P. C. against the opposite parties, the entire proceedings were liable to be quashed. In the alternative the learned Counsel has also urged that the order of attachment is a final order passed under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. (new) and will enure till the rights to the properties, with regard to the person entitled to possession to the disputed land are determined by a competent court.

( 3 ) THE first argument of the learned Counsel is not acceptable to me for a number of reasons. It has been stated in the counter-affidavit that in the civil suit the Munsif had issued a temporary injunction, which was dismissed subsequently. The opposite parties preferred an appeal which was allowed. The matter however, is being agitated in the High Court by the opposite parties. In this view the order of the civil court cannot be said to be final. Secondly, I find from a perusal of the prayer contained in the memorandum of revision that it seeks the setting aside of the order of attachment of the property in dispute under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. There is no prayer contained in this revision for quashing of the proceedings pending under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. For the reasons given above, the first contention of the applicants counsel is repelled.

( 4 ) WITH regard to the second contention, two cases have been brought to my notice by the counsel for the parties. In the decision of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra the scope of interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 (2) Cr. P. C. (new) was un