I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by my brothers Yashoda Nandan and K. C. Agrawal, JJ. Hence, I am advisedly referaining from elaborating the reasoning which has persuaded me to arrive at the conclusions stated in my judgment. I have considered it suffi cient to refer to the conclusion formulated in the two judgments aforesaid and I respectfully adopted the reasoning employed in those judgments in support of those conclusions. I have also had the opportunity of seeing the judgment dated 15-9-1978 tendered by K. R. Goyal, J. in Civil Revision No. 511 of 1978 (Lucknow Bench Mjs. Indira Finance Corporation v. Sri Prem Shanker Awasthi ).

I am in complete agreement with the opinion expressed by Yashoda Nandan and K. C. Agrawal, JJ. that U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 was a later Act than the Central Act No. 104 of 1976. The main reason for my coming to this conclusion is that the mere fact that certain sections of the Central Act No. 104 of 1976 were enforced with effect from 1-2-1977 whereas the U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 had been enforced from 1-1-1977 would not make the Central Act a later Act. The crucial date in the case of these two enactments would be the dates when they received the assent of the President, which in the case of the Central Act was 9-9-1976 while in the case of U. P. Act it was 30-9-1976.

A very striking argument in support of this proposition is that the provision fixing the date from which certain other provisions of the statute are come into force would remain ineffectual if the very statute had not already come into force at all. The provision prescribing the date from which some parts of the Act would be enforced is also an integral part of the statute and unless the statute is operative, no other provision of that statute can oversee the light of the day because the provision prescribing the date of enforcement will itself remain in abeyance. This was the first of the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in T. K. Mudaliar v. Venatachala A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 246. I find myself unable to agree with the view expressed by K. N. Goyal, J. in Civil Revision No. 511 of 1978 that "the Central Act has to be treated as later in point of time. " With respect I am of the opinion that this statement of law is not correct and the case must be over-ruled on that point.

Article 254 of the Constitution of India provides :

"254 (1) If any provision of law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parlia ment is competent to enact, or to any provision of any existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated is the concurrent List, then, subject to the provision of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the re pugnancy, be void.

(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State. . . . . . . . . with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parlia ment or an existing law with respect to that matter, than, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State. "

The Central Act No. 104 of 1976 and the U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 were enacted in pursuance of Entry 13 of List III of the Constitution-Concurrent List. Clause (1) of Article 254 of the Constitution says that if a State law relating to a concurrent subject

is repugnant to a Union Law relating to that subject, then, whether the Union Law is prior or later in time, the Union Law will prevail and State Law shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, be void. To this general rule embodied in clause (1), clause (2) engrafts an exception viz. , that if the Preside