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1980 Supreme(All) 425

HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
S.D.Agarwala
MAHABIR PRASAD CHHATRI
Versus
MADHO PRASAD TANDON
Decided On : 27 October 1980
Second Appeal No. 1896 of 1975

S. D. AGARWALA, J.

This is a defendants second appeal arising out of a suit filed by the plaintiff respondent Madho Prasad Tandon for ejectment of the appellants and arrears of rent in respect of a plot having boundary walls situate towards the road attached to Circular park, which is part of house No. 608, Attarsuiya Allahabad, and is a portion of plot No. 422, South Housing Scheme, Allahabad.

The case of the plaintiff respondent was that the land in dispute was let out to the appellants jointly at Rs. 50/- per mensem as rent exclusive of electri city charges at the rate of Rs. 3/- per mensem in pursuance of an agreement entered into between the

parties on 3rd May 1968. It was alleged that U. P. Act No. III of 1947 did not govern the property in dispute and as such the tenancy was terminated by a notice dated 8th August 1969 and since the appel lants did not vacate the premises hence the suit. In defence the appellants admitted that they are the tenants of the plaintiff respondent at the rate of Rs. 50/- per mensem. In the additional pleas, however, it was alleged that the accommodation in occupation of the appellants consists of one Kothri also along with the plot surrounded by on all sides by boundary walls. It was furt her alleged that the property was governed by U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 and as such a decree for ejectment cannot be passed against the appellants unless one of the grounds set out in U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 had been established.

The trial Court came to the conclusion that the appellants had taken the land alone as a part of their tenancy and thereafter they had made constructions which consist of a kothri, tin shed and a charhai. Since these constructions were made after 1968 and not prior to 1951 as alleged U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 did not apply. The notice for ejectment was held to be valid and as such the suit was decreed on 23rd August 1974. Against the judgment dated 23rd August 1974 an appeal was filed before the lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal on 6th November 1975. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 6th Novem ber 1975 the present second appeal has been filed in this Court.

Learned counsel for the appellants has raised two contentions before me. His first contention is that the building as well as the land was let out and as such U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, namely, U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation on Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, will apply and as such the decree for ejectment cannot be passed against the appellants. The second contention of the learned counsel is that the provisions of Sec. 29-A of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 applies to the present case and as such also no decree for ejectment can be passed against the applicants.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length.

U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 came into force from 15th of July 1972. It applies to buildings. The word building has been defined in Sec. 3 (1), which is as follows:

"building, means a residential or non-residential roofed structure and includes-

(i) any land (including any garden), garages and out-houses, appur tenant to such building;

(ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building;

(iii) any fittings and fixtures affixed to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. "

Section 20 of the Act provides that no suit shall be instituted for the evic tion of a tenant from a building not withstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of the notice to quit or in any other manner except on grounds mentioned in sub-clause (2) of the said section. In the instant case the agreement was entered into between the parties on 3rd May 1968, which is Ext. 4 on record. From this agreement it is clear that what was let out was only land and not building. In the agreement it has been specifically written that the appellants will carry on the milk business on the land in dispute for which purpose they had taken the land on lease. It has bean further specifically provid








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