1981 Supreme(All) 176
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
H.N.Seth, R.B.Lal
INDRA DEO PANDEY
Versus
BHAGWAT
Decided On : 10 March 1981
Criminal Misc. Application No. 2397 of 1980
On January 5, 1979, during pendency of proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sub-Divisional Magistrate Mohammadbad, district Ghazipur passed an order under Section 146 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directing that the plots in respect of which there existed a dispute causing apprehension of breach of peace be attached and that the order dated October 28, 1978 directing attachment of crop standing thereon and for its being kept in custody of a Supurdar, be maintained. Aggrieved, the applicant invoked revisional jurisdiction of Sessions Judge, Ghazipur. The III Additional Sessions Judge, Ghazipur, who eventually heard the revision application, relied upon a decision of a Single Judge of this Court in the case of Smt. Prem Lata v. Ram Lubhaya (1978 A. C. C. 336) and held that as the order in question was an interlocutory order his revisional jurisdiction was as laid down in Sector. 397 (2) of the Code, barred. In the result he, vide his order dated February 28, 1980 dismissed the revisional application filed by the applicant. The applicant then filed the present application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before this Court and prayed that order dated January 5, 1979 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Mohammadabad as also that dated February 28. 1960 passed by the Sessions Judge. Ghazipur be quashed. When the application came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court, learned counsel appearing for the applicant relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sohan Lal Barman v. State (1977 A. C. C 10) wherein it had been held that as an order for attachment of property made under Section 146 (1) of the Code conclude the proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Code, such an order cannot be described as an interlocutory order which under Section 397 (2) of the Code has been made nameable to provisional jurisdiction of Sessions Judge and High Court. As, however, the contrary decision by a Single Judge of this Court in the case of Prem Lata v. Ram Lubhaya (1978 A. C. C. 336) relied upon by the Sessions Judge for holding that the order dated January 5, 1979 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was an interlocutory order and as such not revisable drew its inspiration from certain observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Chandu Naik and others v. Sita Ram (A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 10.) the learned Single Judge thought it fit that the question involved in this case, namely whether if after making an order under Section 145 (6) of the Code, the Magistrate considers that there is emergency and makes an order attaching the property in dispute under Section 146 (1) of the Code, such order would fall in the category of interlocutory orders, should be decided by a larger Bench. He accordingly referred the case for decision by a larger Bench and this is how this case has come up for hearing before us. The question as to whether an order for attachment of property made in the circumstances mentioned above is an interlocutory order or not, has arisen in the context of the provisions contained in Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which runs thus;-
" 397 (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself of himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order he suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released in bail or on his own pending the examination of the record. Explanation:-All Magistrate, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be infe