Detention under the National Security Act can be justified based on a single criminal activity if it creates a belief that the individual is likely to repeat similar activities affecting public order.

( 1 ) THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by Rajan Lal Sharma is directed against the order passed by the District Magistrate on 21st Oct. , 1983 authorising his detention under the provisions of Section 3 of the National Security Act.

( 2 ) THE petitioner was arrested in connection with a case under S, 395/397 I. P. C. on 25-9-83 and was sent to jail. The impugned order for petitioners detention was passed on 21st Oct. , 1983 and served upon him while he was in jail custody.

( 3 ) THE grounds for detention served upon the petitioner mentioned that on 15th Sept. , 1983 at about 9. 3o A. M. he along with his companions overtook a car going on the National Highway and thereafter committed dacoity in broad day light. As a result of the said dacoity the traffic on the Highway came to halt and lot of panic and tension was created in the locality. The grounds further recited that as the petitioner was likely to be released on bail and to indulge in activities prejudicial to public order, it was necessary to detain him.

( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contends that merely on the basis of a single incident of dacoity, the District Magistrate was not justified in concluding that the petitioner was likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order. We find no merit in this submission. An order directing detention of a person under Section 3 of the National Security Act is made when the detaining authority feels satisfied that such person is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order and that it is necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from so acting. Generally such satisfaction is arrived at on the basis of such previous conduct of the concerned person which betrays a tendency in him to act in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order in near future. While it is true that generally a single criminal activity does not betray that the criminal is likely to indulge in similar activity in future but then there can be cases where a criminal activity takes place in circumstances which may be sufficient to create a feeling in the mind of the detaining authority that if not detained, the criminal is likely to repeat similar activity affecting public order. In such cases we do not see why requisite satisfaction of the detaining authority based on a single incident should not be sufficient to sustain an order made under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act. We are in this view fully supported by following observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Alijan Mian v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad: Now the question arises whether the two incidents were sufficient for the detaining authority to initiate proceedings for preventive detention. It is for the detaining authority to have the subjective satisfaction about the apprehension of the breach of the public order from the incident mentioned above. Even one incident may be sufficient to satisfy the detaining authority. It all depends upon the nature of the incident. . . .

( 5 ) IN the instant case the allegation, against the petitioner was that he along with his companions had, in broad day light, overtaken a car on a National High way and committed dacoity. His action had, as a matter of fact, created panic and tension in the locality. Holds up and commission of dacoity on National High Ways in broad day light has assumed such proportions that it generally affects the even flow of life in the community. It is common knowledge that persons committing High Ways robberies and holds up, if not checked have a tendency to repeat these activities as and when they find an occasion for the same. Accordingly the circumstances in which the dacoity had been committed were such in which the detaining authority could entertain a belief that if allowed to remain free, the petitioner was likely to commit similar crime. Thus the District Magistrate could, on the basis of this solitary inc