UMESHWAR PANDEY, J.

This Second Appeal arises out of the judgment and decree dated 8-8-1977 passed by the District Judge, Ghazipur.

2. The brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that the appellant-plaintiffs suit was for permanent injunction to restrain the respondent-defendant from recovering the certain sums of money under an award duly decided and confirmed by the arbitrator under Section 71 of U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the act ). According to the plaint case, the entire amount due against him in the award was paid by him to the Co-operative Amin. As such, he had no liability of any such further payment. The defendant-Co-operative Society contested the suit and filed the written statement. It was pleaded that the suit was barred under Sections 102 and 111 of the Act. The learned trial Court framed an issue on this point and gave its finding in affirmative holding that the suit was barred under Section 102 and 111 of the Act. On appeal the Lower Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded in regard to the bar of the suit and finding no merit in the appeal dismissed it by the impugned judgment dated 8-8-1977.

3. Aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment of the 1st Appellate Court, the plaintiff-appellant has approached this Court in the present Second Appeal.

4. I have heard Sri Sankatha Rai, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri S. K. Verma, learned counsel for the respondents. The substantial question of law arising in this appeal is as below:

"whether the suit is barred under Sections 102/111 of the LIP. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 and also under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. "

5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that in his suit for the grant of permanent injunction under the Specific Relief Act, the bar of Sections 102 and 111 of the Act will not operate because the nature of the dispute neither requires a reference to be made to the Registrar under Section 70 of the Act nor does it amount to a dispute relating to the award given and duly satisfied by making full payment by the plaintiff to the recovery Amin.

6. In reply to the aforesaid submission made on behalf of the appellant, learned counsel for the respondent-Co-operative Society states that the bar envisaged under Sections 102 and 111 of the Act will definitely operate in the present case, as the dispute raised for decision in the present suit would be covered by clause (d) of Section 111 of the Act. He has also submitted that the remedy for all the grievances, as demonstrated by the plaintiff-appellant in his pleadings, is available within the framework of the provisions of the Act and as such, the relief from the Civil Court as has been claimed would also be impliedly barred. The learned counsel has cited the case law of The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v.

Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay and others, (1976) 1 S. C. C. 496 and Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Krishna Kant and others, (1995) 5 S. C. C. 75.

7. In the present case, it is admitted that undisputedly there was a dispute within the meaning of Clause (a) of sub-Section (2) of Section 70 of the Act, which was referred for arbitration under Section 71 and an award was made for recovery of an amount under the said provision. The said award is not disputed. The appellant-plaintiff claims that the award, which is executable within the provisions of Section 92 of the Act was satisfied before it was put in execution and the award money was paid and a payment receipt was obtained from the Amin. Any fresh proceeding to further realize the same amount already recovered is being resisted by means of the aforesaid Civil Suit and it cannot be legally treated as barred under the provisions of Sections 102 and 111 of the Act or Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short c. P. C. ). The learned counsel for the appellant has stressed that this suit is not by way of a challenge against the award it

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