2004 Supreme(All) 1847
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Amar Saran, J.
Mohan Shukla, Late Brij Nath Shukla
Versus
State of U.P.
Criminal Misc. Application 7484 of 2004
Decided On : 05 October 2004
Criminal Misc. Application 7484 Of 2004
A.K.SHUKLA,
An application under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C can be treated as a complaint if it states facts constituting a cognizable offense, and the Magistrate has the authority to proceed with the case.
Headnote:
Section 482 Cr. P. C - Quashing of Proceedings - Sections 156(3), 200, 202, 210 Cr. P. C - IPC Sections 323, 504, 506, 427, 379 - Summary
Fact of the Case:
The applicants filed an application under Section 482 Cr. P. C to quash the proceedings in complaint case No. 3708 of 2000 pending before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, court No. 10, Ballia, contending that the complaint proceedings were initiated on an application under section 156 (3) Cr. P. C and should not be treated as a complaint.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the application under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C could be treated as a complaint, and the subsequent proceedings were legal. The court also directed the trial court to conclude the proceedings expeditiously.
Issues: The main issue was whether an application under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C could be treated as a complaint, and the legality of the subsequent proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that an application under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C could be treated as a complaint if it stated facts constituting a cognizable offense, and the Magistrate had the authority to proceed with the case.
Final Decision: The application under Section 482 Cr. P. C was dismissed, and the trial court was directed to conclude the proceedings expeditiously.
( 1 ) HEARD learned counsel for the applicants and learned Additional Government Advocate representing the State.
( 2 ) THIS application under Section 482 Cr. P. C has been filed for quashing the entire proceedings in complaint case No. 3708 of 2000 pending before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, court No. 10, Ballia.
( 3 ) THE basic ground for quashing the complaint proceedings arising out of an application under section 156 (3) Cr. P. C was that complaint proceedings were initiated on an application under section 156 (3) Cr. P. C dated 5. 8. 2000.
( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the applicants contends that an application under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C could never be treated as a complaint and for this purpose the learned counsel has principally relied upon two decisions given by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the cases of Ram Anuj dubey v. State of U. P. 2003 (2) A. Cr. R. 1897 and Surya Nath Yadav v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 2003 (3) A. Cr. R. 2729. These decisions in turn relied upon another Single Judge decision in the case of Dinesh Chandra v. State of U. P. , 2000 (41) ACC 831.
( 5 ) IN the present case after perusing the application under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. dated 5. 8. 2000 and examining the complainant under Section 200 Cr. P. C. and his witnesses under Section 202 cr. P. C. , the applicants were summoned on 7. 9. 2002 under Sections 323/504/506/427/379 IPC by the order of A. C. J. M-X, Ballia.
( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the applicants contends that as the basic foundation for adopting the procedure of a complaint case on an application under Section 156 (3) Crpc is illegal, the subsequent application under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. is illegal, the judgment orders such as the order dated 7. 11. 2002 whereby the learned A. C. J. M refused to dismiss the complaint also become illegal.
( 7 ) IT may be mentioned that the judgements of Honble K. N. Sinha, J, relied upon Dy the learned counsel for the applicants, appear to be per-incuriam. These judgements have failed to consider the Full Bench decision of this Court in the ease of Ram Babu Gupta v. State of U. P. 2001 (43)ACC 50. Before the Full Bench specifically one of the questions in issue was: " Is the observation of the Division bench in Suraj Mal (Supra) correct when it says that when an applicant before a Magistrate prays only for registration and investigation of a case, such an application will not become "complaint" as defined in Section 2 of the Cr. P. C. ? "
( 8 ) THE specific answer to this question in the aforesaid Full Bench decision of this Court was given in paragraphs 18 and IV of the decision, which are as follows:
"18. Coming to the second question noted above it is to be at once stated that a provision empowering a court to act in a particular manner and a provision creating a right for an aggrieved person to approach a Court or authority, must he understood distinctively and should not be mixed up. While Sections 154, 155 Sub-section (1) and (2) of 156, Cr. P. C. confer right on an aggrieved person to reach the police, 156 (3) empowers a Magistrate to act in a particular manner in a given situation. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that where a bare application is moved before court only praying for exercise of powers under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C, it will remain an application only and would not be in the nature of a complaint. It has been noted above that the Magistrate has to always apply his mind on the allegations in the complaint where he may use his powers under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. In this connection it may be immediately added that where in an application, a complainant states facts which constitute cognizable offence but makes a defective prayer, such an application will not cease to be complaint nor can the Magistrate refuse to treat it as a complaint even though there be no prayer seeking trial of the known or unknown accused. The Magistrate has to deal with such facts as constitute cognizable o