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1998 Supreme(All) 750

HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
D.K.Seth
RANA HARIRAM SINGH
Versus
UNION OF INDIA MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Decided On : 24 July 1998
C. M. W. R No. 15200 of 1992

Advocates Appeared:
Ashok Mehta, PATANJALI MISHRA, SUSHIL HARKAULI,

A deduction under Section 91 (g) of the Army Act is an administrative decision and not a punishment, and therefore does not bar a subsequent trial by court martial for the same offence.

Headnote:

ARMY ACT - SECTION 91 (G) - SECTION 121 - RULE 53 - ARMY RULES - SUMMARY COURT MARTIAL - DOUBLE JEOPARDY - PENAL DEDUCTION - ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION - JUDICIAL DECISION - SCALE OF PUNISHMENT - DISMISSAL - HARSH PUNISHMENT - WRIT PETITION - DISMISSED.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, a soldier, was subjected to a summary court martial and dismissed from service for quitting his post and causing loss of liquor. He had previously been subjected to a deduction from his pay under Section 91 (g) of the Army Act for the same loss.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the deduction under Section 91 (g) was an administrative decision and not a punishment, and therefore the petitioner was not subjected to double jeopardy by being tried by court martial for the same offence. The court also held that the punishment of dismissal was not harsh or excessive, given the gravity of the petitioner's offence.

Issues: 1. Whether the deduction under Section 91 (g) of the Army Act was a punishment or an administrative decision. 2. Whether the petitioner was subjected to double jeopardy by being tried by court martial for the same offence for which he had already been subjected to a deduction under Section 91 (g). 3. Whether the punishment of dismissal was harsh or excessive.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the deduction under Section 91 (g) was an administrative decision and not a punishment because: - Section 91 (g) does not specify that the penal deduction contemplated under said clauses is authorised only because of exercise of the jurisdiction of Section 80. - The deduction under Section 91 (g) can be made through exercise of administrative authority. - The deduction under Section 91 (g) is included in Section 80 as one of the punishments, indicating that when inflicted in exercise of Section 80 it is a punishment and when inflicted without exercise of Section 80, it is an administrative decision to effect penal deduction. 2. The court held that the petitioner was not subjected to double jeopardy because: - The deduction under Section 91 (g) was an administrative decision and not a punishment. - The trial by court martial was for a different offence, namely, quitting his post and causing loss of liquor, than the offence for which he had been subjected to the deduction under Section 91 (g), namely, causing loss of liquor. 3. The court held that the punishment of dismissal was not harsh or excessive because: - The offence of quitting his post and causing loss of liquor was a grave offence. - The normal punishment for such an offence was rigorous imprisonment for six months and dismissal from service. - The punishment of dismissal only was less than the normal punishment.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the petitioner's writ petition.

D. K. SETH, J.

While assailing the impugned order of punishment dated 11-4-1992 contained in Annexure-5 to this writ petition, Mr. Ashok Mehta, learned Counsel for the petitioner, had contended that out of the allegations in which the said order of punishment was inflicted after summary court martial, recovery was af fected under Section 91 (g) of the Army Act and, therefore, the summary court martial is hit by Section 121 read with Rule 53 of the Army Rules. In order to substan tiate his contention, Mr. Mehta submitted that under Section 25 of the Army Act, no deduction can be made from the pay of the person subjected to Army Act except authorised by or under by this or under any other Act. Section 91 (g) prescribes the authority to deduct if any loss is caused by the conduct of such person. The loss having been recovered under Section 91 (g) from the petitioner, which is the admitted position and such recovery being penal in nature as is apparent from the expression used in Section 91 which uses the-expression penal deduction and such deduction under Section 91 (g) being a punishment within the meaning of Sec tion 80 (i), once such deduction is made, the same is punishment. Punishment being dealt with under Section 91 (g), he cannot be subjected to be tried again for the same offence by a Court martial or dealt with under Section 80, 83 & 85 in view of the provisions contained in Sec tion 121 read with Rule 53 which bars trial in respect of the offences which has been tried by Court martial or dealt with pre viously. According to the learned Counsel, Section 80 is a protection, under which a person is entitled to take shelter since in Clause (i) penal deduction under Section 91 (g) has been described as a punishment which having been dealt with previously, the petitioner could not be subjected to summary court martial and therefore, the punishment inflicted being hit by the prin ciple of double jeopardy as provided under Section 121 read with Rule 53 cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. He contends further that the rules and regula tions are framed under Sections 191 & 192 respectively and such regulation having been framed as to reconcile with the ap plication of the said provisions relating to enlistment of punishment which prescribes in regulation 448 that the char ges alleged against the petitioner should have been awarded according to the table of punishment, which does not postulate awarding of punishment of dismissal as in the present case which according to him could have been rigorous imprisonment for three months or six months as the case may be, on the basis of the charges levelled against him. Thus, according to him, the punishment awarded is also dispropor tionate and wholly outside the scope and ambit of scale of punishment as provided therein. He contends further that the Army Act is a complete Code in itself with regard to service conditions and penalties provided therein for various offences as the case may be. Accordingly in the Act, Rules and Regulations adequate and ap propriate safety valves have been provided which are of great importance and to be followed scrupulously. In as much as in order to protect from the excess exercise of jurisdiction, several measures have been provided and specific scope and arnbit has been laid down, within which entire process has to be confined and as such stress is to be laid on safety valves provided in Section 121 read with Rule 53 and as well as Regulation 448, Section 80 read with Section 25, 91 (g) respectively and in case of any doubt, it has to be interpreted for the benefit of delinquent subjected to punishment.

2. Mr. Sushil Harkauli, learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand, contends that the bar as provided in Rule 121 read with Rule 53 is confined in its application within the scope of inflict ing punishment under any of the provisions which empowers the authority to try a person either through Court mar tial or to deal with the perso
















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