The existence of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to entertain claim petitions challenging a suspension order operates as a bar to the High Court's jurisdiction in entertaining writ petitions directly.

By this common judgment, both these petitions are being disposed of to gether.

2. In both these petitions, mainly and primarily, the orders placing the pe titioners under suspension have been challenged. It is the admitted case of the petitioners that the petitioners have straightway approached this Court by invoking this Courts extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Con stitution of India without having first availed of the alternative remedy of ap proaching the Uttarakhand State Public Service Tribunal in terms of Section 4 of the U. P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 (1976 Act for short ).

3. At the very threshold, a prelimi nary objection has been raised by the re spondents about the maintainability of these petitions in this Court on the ground that since the petitioners, in both the cases, had the alternative remedy of approaching the Tribunal under Section 4 of 1976 Act and the said alternative remedy being efficacious, these writ pe titions may be dismissed on this ground alone and the petitioners be directed to approach the Tribunal.

4. The learned counsel for the peti tioners, in both the cases, have made two-fold submissions in support of their contention that the writ petitions are maintainable in this Court. Their first contention is that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim petition under Section 4 of 1976 Act with respect to a suspension order. The second sub mission, which also is in the nature of an alternative submission, is that if it is held that the Tribunal has the jurisdic tion to entertain the claim petition under Section 4 with respect to a suspen sion order, the alternative remedy is not at all efficacious and it is illusory, inas much as, in terms of sub-section (5-B) of Section 5 of 1976 Act, the Tribunal has no power as well as the jurisdiction to grant any interim relief with respect to an order of suspension, the petition ers are left with no option but to ap proach this Court directly by invoking this Courts writ jurisdiction under Arti cle 226 of the Constitution of India be cause the relief claimed by the petition ers cannot be effectively granted to them unless the operation of the suspension orders, in both the cases, is stayed.

5. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of 1976 Act (this sub-section alone, being relevant for our purposes), which deals with the issue of the Tribunal entertain ing claim petitions, reads thus :

"4. Reference of claim to Tribu nal.- (1) Subject to the other pro visions of this Act, a person who is or has been a public servant and is aggrieved by an order pertaining to a service matter within the jurisdic tion of the Tribunal, may make a reference of claim to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. "

6. Section 5 of 1976 Act relates to the powers and procedure of the Tribu nal and contains various stipulations and provisions with respect to the exer cise of the power by the Tribunal in deciding the claim petitions and the various aspects of the procedure to be applied and adopted by it for disposing of such claim petitions. Whereas sub section (5-A) of Section 5 restrains the Tribunal from granting any interim order except in compliance with the stipula tions contained in Clauses (a) and (b) thereof (but, in effect and substance, proviso to Clauses (a) and (b) being read together with these two clauses, cloth ing the Tribunal with the power of grant ing interim relief), sub-section (5-B) of Section 5 puts a total embargo and operates as a complete bar with respect to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in granting any interim relief or passing any interim order, whether by way of injunc tion or stay, with respect to certain types and categories or orders mentioned therein such as suspension, dismissal, removal etc. etc. In other words, as per sub-section (5-B) supra, the Legislature has completely and clearly prohibited and barred the Tribunal, unequivocally and without any reservation, in granting any interim