The main legal point established in the judgment is that a suit based on an award is barred only if it is filed for its enforcement, and that an award not made rule of the Court could still be relied upon and should not be disregarded by the Court.

( 1 ) LIST has been revised but none appears for the respondents.

( 2 ) HEARD Sri Prakash Gupta, learned Counsel for the petitioners.

( 3 ) THIS writ petition is directed against a revisional order dated 28. 10. 1996 by which an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C. P. C. filed by the defendant-respondents that the suit was barred by Section 32 of the Arbitration Act has been allowed.

( 4 ) DR. Mohd. Afzal was the owner of disputed properties. On his death differences between his two wives arose with regard to the properties left behind by him. It appears that the dispute with regard to the shares amongst the wives and other heirs was settled by the intervention of their well wishers which was reduced in writing and signed by the parties. It is alleged that they took respective possession of their shares but as the respondents were raising some dispute, the plaintiff-petitioners filed a Suit No. 30 of 1980 for declaration of her title. The defendant respondents filed their written statement, inter alia, stating that the plaintiff No. 1 was not a legally wedded wife of late Dr. Mohd. Afzal and the petitioner No. 2 was not his daughter and in fact the defendant No. 2 was the legally wedded wife. However, it was admitted that certain well wishers were chosen to be mediators for settling the shares between the parties but subsequently they were removed on the ground that they were biased in favour of the plaintiffs and, therefore, the settlement was illegal and inoperative. After the issues had been framed and the suit was fixed for hearing, an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C. P. C. was moved on behalf of the defendants stating that since the right and title is based on the arbitration agreement and as it was not made rule of the Court, the suit was hit by Section 32 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The trial court rejected the application having found that neither the right was based upon the agreement nor it was an award and as such it rejected the application. On revision, the order of the trial court was set aside vide impugned order dated 28. 10. 1996 and the application was allowed holding that the suit was barred under the Act.

( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners has urged that the plaintiffs had alleged her independent title irrespective of the compromise and the suit was not for enforcement of the said compromise.

( 6 ) A perusal of the plaint shows that Smt. Shahjahan Begum claimed to be one of the two wives of the deceased Dr. Mohd. Afzal, while the plaintiff No. 2 was claimed to be the daughter out of the aforesaid wedlock. It was further claimed that Dr. Mohd. Afzal died interstate leaving behind several properties and when differences between the parties arose, with the intervention of about five well wishers, the plaintiffs were given the disputed house in their share while the rest of the properties was given to the share of the defendants. It was further claimed that the aforesaid compromise/agreement was duly signed by the parties and they came in possession of their respective shares. However, since the defendants were creating fresh disputes the declaratory suit had to be filed. Thus, it is evident that the claim of the plaintiffs was that she being one of the two wives had a right to the property of her deceased husband. The division of shares was based on the alleged compromise/ agreement between the parties on the intervention of the well wishers. It would be worthy of note, though it is not determinative of the real question, that the defendants had admitted in their written statement the role of the mediators into settling the shares but the existence of the agreement/compromise or its validity was denied. The revisional court by adopting a legal technical meaning of the Urdu word salis meaning arbitrator held that the compromise/agreement was an award. It further went on to hold that since the right is claimed only through the award as mentioned in the plaint, but as no indep