R. P. Misra, J.—Heard Sri M.D. Singh, ‘Shekhar’, learned counsel for the petitioner.

2. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the impugned order dated 1.2.2003 passed by Additional District Judge (Court No. 32), Ghaziabad, and also for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing Additional District Judge (Court No. 3), Ghaziabad, the District Judge, Ghaziabad and his subordinate officers, not to interfere in the right of the petitioner to appear, plead and act on behalf of the party in a civil case on the basis of the special power of attorney executed in favour of the petitioner.

3. By the aforesaid order dated 1.2.2003, passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 57 and 58 of 1995, learned Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad, has refused to permit the petitioner to advance arguments in the aforesaid appeals on behalf of the appellants on the basis of special power of attorney executed in favour of the petitioner and has directed the appellants to engage counsel within 15 days.

4. According to the petitioner, the appellants are unable to engage any legal practitioner due to poverty and are also unable to advance arguments due to lack of legal knowledge, therefore, they have executed the special power of attorney in favour of the petitioner to appear, apply and act for them.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that in view of the provisions contained in Order III, Rules (1) and (2) read with Section 2 (15) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’), the petitioner has right to appear, act and plead for the party who executes special power of attorney in his favour. He further submitted that the provisions of Sections 32, 33 and 55 of the Advocates Act, if read together, do not put any restriction on the right of petitioner to plead, apply and act for a party who executes special power of attorney in his favour. In support of the submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner strongly relied upon the decisions in case of Ram Swaroop Jatav v. State of U. P. and others, 1994 (31) ACrC 311 and Hari Shankar Rastogi v. Girdhari Sharma and another, 1978 ACrR 363 (SC) : AIR 1978 SC 1019.

6. Before adverting to deal with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it appears necessary to point out that this writ petition has been filed by a person who himself is neither a party to the proceeding pending before the Additional Distt. Judge, Ghaziabad, nor was a legal practitioner immediately before coming into force of the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961, nor is an Advocate within the meaning of Advocates Act, 1961 and none of the parties to the said proceeding has joined as petitioner in this writ petition. The petitioner has alleged that he has not charged a single penny for pleading and acting on behalf of the party concerned. If that be so, how the petitioner is a person aggrieved and then how this writ petition is maintainable only on his behalf. Any way, as the elaborate arguments have been advanced on behalf of the petitioner, it appears too technical to look into so deeply the question of maintainability of the writ petition on behalf of petitioner alone ; therefore, I proceed to decide the writ petition on its merits.

7. The first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that under Order III, Rules (1) and (2) read with Section 2 (15) of the Code, the petitioner has got a right to plead, apply and act for the parties who execute special power of attorney in favour of the petitioner and the Court below has no power, authority and jurisdiction to deny the said right to the petitioner.

8. Section 2 (15) of the Code defines the term ‘pleader’ to mean any person entitled to appear and plead for another in Court, and includes an advocate, a vakil and an attorney of a High Court. There is no quarrel with the definition of the term ‘pleader’ and wherever this term is u